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The contributions of the student editors in this issue have beet written under
the supervision of individual members of the law faculty. Publication of signed
contributions from any source does not signify adoption of the views expressed by
the LAW REVIEw or its editors collectively.
The LAw REvIEW makes the following announcements:
The following student editors have been selected from the second year class:
Alex B. Andrews, III, 0. W. Clayton, J. William Copeland, and Paul F. Mickey.
B. Irvin Boyle has been selected as a student editor from the third year class.
N. A Townsend, Jr. has been selected as Student Editor-in-Chief for the remainder of this year.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Independent Contractors-Inherent Danger as
Question for Judge or Jury.
The liability of an employer, principal, for acts of his agent is said
to be avoided if the employer engages the services of an independent

contractor. But it is equally established that one cannot escape liability
by entering into an independent contract, if the work to be done by the
contractor is "inherently or intrinsically dangerous."
Is this question of inherent danger one for the court or for the
jury? It is commonly said that questions of law are for the court and
matters of fact for the jury; which means, in general, that when the
question is one of law the court decides. If the facts relevant to that
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question are in dispute, he will submit alternative charges to the jury
as to how to find, depending upon which interpretation they put upon
the disputed facts (e.g. probable cause in action of malicious prosecution). 1
If it is a so-called question of fact for the jury, then the judge will
charge the jury abstractly with general definitions and standards, leaving to them the application thereof (e.g. negligence).2
An examination of the cases should reveal either that the, courts
state that they are treating this general question of inherent danger as:
(1) fact for the jury (as negligence is treated), or (2) law for the
court (as probable cause is treated). Unfortunately such clarity is not
to be found. The courts do not say which view they take.
The overwhelming majority of courts seem to rule merely, whether,
on the facts of the case at hand, there is or is not inherent danger,
without saying it is a question of fact or law.
For instance, in a typical case, 3 the delivery boy for the defendant
coal company caused injury to the plaintiff by allowing a coal chute
cover to be raised under her without any warning as she walked over
it. As to the question of whether the employer could escape liability
due to his independent contract for delivering coal, or must forego his
defense because of the inherently dangerous nature of the work involved, the court said: "We are of the opinion that the work was of a
hazardous character and inherently dangerous." And again: "Accepting as correct the definition of intrinsically dangerous work, . . . we
hold that the work to be performed in this instance was of an inherently
dangerous character."
In deciding the problem on the facts of the cases, the courts do not
necessarily imply that it is being treated as a question of law, because
there are two possible explanations for deciding the problem themselves:
I. The question of inherent danger might be regarded as one of law
for the court (like probable cause).
II. Or, the question of inherent danger might be regarded as one of
fact for the jury; yet, on the particular facts involved, the court might
be deciding as if it were a question of law merely because reasonable
minds could not differ.4 in which case it would become a law question
15 WIGMoRr, EviDENcE (2nd. ed. 1923) §2554.
5 Wia oE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2552.
o Cole v. Durham, 176 N. C. 289, 97 S. E. 33 (1918).
'In Wetherbee v. Partridge, 175 Mass. 185, 55 N. E. 894 (1900), the court
said: "In some cases of blasting under an independent contract we might go no
further than to hold that there was a question for the jury whether the danger was
so great as to make the defendant liable. But in the case at bar the danger was
so obvious that only one conclusion was possible." In Norwalk Gas Co. v. Borough
of Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 28 Atl. 32 (1893) the lower court charged that the
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for the court anyway.5
If the latter is a true picture it would seem that inherent danger is
being treated like negligence, in that it is generally a question of fact
for the jury, but with special rules applicable to special situations, such
as the rules of negligence per se.
The rulings are sometimes so confused and contradictory that they
appear to approve both the court and the jury as solely qualified to
decide the question. A North Carolina case 6 represents the ultimate in
confusion arising from the nebulous state of the law on this subject.
The defendant employed an independent contractor to make an excavation adjacent to the abutting wall of the plaintiff. In the course of
the work the plaintiff's wall was damaged. Held: judgment for the
plaintiff. Although the initial discussion seemed to regard it as a question of law, the court approved a part of a charge requested by the
defendant and implying that it was a jury question. Next, the court
cited with approval a Maryland case with a similar fact situation 7
wherein the court declared: "The question whether such injury reasonably might have been anticipated as a probable consequence of the
excavation was a question of fact for the jury."
Antithetically, the North Carolina Supreme Court then approved
the charge given below, 8 which inferred that the decision was one of
question of inherent danger was one for the jury. The Supreme Court disapproved
the charge, saying: "We think, also, that the operation of -blasting with dynamite
is intrinsically dangerous; that the court should have taken judicial notice that
it is so; and that the charge on this point is not correct."
I Although the cases in which the court will decide are determined on their
particular facts and cannot be categorized, yet there are certain types of questions
which are usually regarded as for the court rather than for the jury. For instance,
when blasting is involved: Hunter v. Southern Railway Co., 152 N. C. 682, 68 S. E.
237 (1910) (building a railway) ; Arthur v. Henry, 157 N. C. 393, 73 S. E. 206
(1911) (rocks thrown on plaintiff's house) ; Watson v. Black Mountain Ry. Co., 164
N. C. 176, 80 S. E. 175 (1913) (redrilling charged holes) ; Greer v. Construction
Co., 190 N. C. 632, 13 S. E. 739 (1925) (building a highway). Similarly, lumbering operations employing steam driven trains; Strickland v. Montgomery Lumber
Co., 171 N. C. 755, 88 S. E. 340 (1916) ; Simmons v. Roper Lumber Co., 171 N. C.
220, 93 S. E. 736 (1917). Excavating or obstructing thoroughfares: Woodman v.
Metropolitan Ry. Co., 149 Mass. 335, 21 N. E. 482 (1889); Bailey v. City of Winston, 157 N. C. 252, 72 S. E. 966 (1911) ; Carrick v. Southern Power Co,, 157 N. C.
378, 72 S. E. 1065 (1911); Dunlap v. Raleigh, Charlotte and Southern Ry. Co.,
167 N. C. 669, 83 S. E. 703 (1914) ; Peters v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills,
Inc., 199 N. C. 753, 155 S. E. 867 (1930), (involving electricity) ; Montgomery v.
Gulf Refining Co., 168 La. 73, 121 So. 578 (1929) (involving delivery of gasoline).
Types of %vorkwhich courts will usually declare not to be inherently dangerous:
Vogh v. Geer, 171 N. C. 672, 88 S. E. 874 (1916) (erection of a concrete building); Gadsden v. Craft, 173 N. C. 418, 92 S. E. 174 (1917) (construction of a
bridge).
'Davis v. Summerfield, 133 N. C. 325, 45 S. E. 654 (1903).
' Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 42, 4 At. 918 (1899).
". . .

the court also charges you that the employment of an independent con-

tractor, who is competent and skillful, to make an excavation on a lot in near
proximity to a neighbor's house in a populous city . . . does not relieve the
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law for the court. In thus approving these two apparently contrary
charges, the court seems to contradict itself and presents a typical example of the current confusion. 9
The present non-committal vagueness leaves open the possibility that
more courts will eventually state that inherent danger, like negligence,
is a question of fact and that it has been decided by the courts in the
particular instances, only because reasonable minds could not differ.
Such a trend, however, would but add to the existing uncertainty
and could be eliminated by having the courts commit themselves definitely that inherent danger is a question of law for the court.
This would be much more desirable than treating it as fact because
the traditional susceptibility of the jury to emotional influences would
work an unfair hardship on the defendant, who is usually a corporateemployer. This situation, in addition to the technical and confused
nature of the problems commonly involved, would seem to indicate that
the courts are much better qualified to make such decisions than are
the juries, and as the courts have repeatedly shown their desire to decide
such questions, their clear intent should be crystallized into a routine
policy thereby eliminating much of the presently prevalent confusion on
this subject.
ALEX B. ANDREWS III.

Contracts-Rescission-Marriage as Consideration.
Plaintiff conveyed to defendant land worth $15,000 in exchange
for her oral promise to marry, live with, and care for him so long as
both should live. Six months after the marriage defendant left him
under circumstances showing no fault on his part. Plaintiff sued for
cancellation of the deed, alleging fraud. There was some evidence
from which fraud might have been inferred.1 Held; defendant's mo2
tion for nonsuit was properly granted.
proprietor from the obligation . . . to see that the contractor protects his neighbor's wall.. . or to give timely notice."
'In Scales v. Llewellyn, 172 N. C. 494, 90 S. E. 521 (1916), the court below

submitted the question to the jury as one of fact. The Supreme Court held that
the lower court applied an improper test for inherent danger, and also inferred

that the question was not for the jury, but for the court

' Witnesses testified that shortly before leaving plaintiff, defendant declared
she had married him only until she could do better, that she did not love plaintiff
Nvhen she married him, and that she was not going to stay with the "old devil"
much longer.
'Whitley v. Whitley, 209 N. C. 25, 182 S. E. 658 (1935). The facts present
a new chapter in love's old story, which will probably be remembered long after
the legal aspects of the case are forgotten. Plaintiff testified: "We had a marriage contract which was not in writing. She agreed to marry me if I would give
her the tract of land described in the deed, and I told her I would give her the
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The appeal presented one direct question: viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, was there sufficient evidence of fraud to be
submitted to the jury.8 Seemingly disregarding this issue, the court
purported to base its decision upon three grounds: (1) that marriage
was good consideration for the contract; (2) that defendant's promise was at most a condition subsequent, breach of which would not
affect the validity of the deed; and (3) that plaintiff could not restore
the status quo. The relevancy of the first two is questionable, but the
third might ultimately decide the case, even if plaintiff succeeded in
proving fraud.
While marriage has long been regarded as valuable consideration
for a contract, 4 the courts have differed as to the time when full value
of this consideration is passed. Most of the holdings adopt the view
that performance of the ceremony constitutes complete performance,5
but there is respectable authority for the proposition that marriage
land if she would take care of me her lifetime or my lifetime. We were in the
cow shed. She was milking, and we shook hands on it across the cow's back.
I gave her the land, and we were married the next day. She lived with me six
months, and then left my home."
"I had a conversation with her the day she left. I told her that I had an
uncle in Stanly County and that he lived to be 105 years old, and then cleared
a new ground. I told her I believed I was going to live that long. When I said
that she come up and hit me in the eye. My foot slipped, and I got penned up between the walls of the house, and she 'beat me over the head until she got satisfied
and quit. Within 30 minutes she left my house and has never been back since."
'Gates v. Max, 125 N. C. 139, 34 S. E. 266 (1899); Madry v. Moore, 161
N. C. 295, 77 S. E. 241 (1913); Lawske v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 191 N. C.
473, 132 S. E. 160 (1925) ; Ledford v. Tallassee Power Co., 194 N. C. 98, 138
S. E. 424 (1927). See also McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcTIcE AND PROcEDU (1929) §565 (4).
'In Johnston v. Dilliard 1. S. C. 93 (1792), marriage was said to be "the
highest consideration known to law." In the law of fraudulent conveyances where
the question commonly arises, it has been necessary to give it great weight as
consideration to -defeat the claims of creditors. Aufdemkampf v. Pierce, 4
Cal. App. (2d) 250, 40 Pac. (2d) 599 (1935); De Hierapolis v. Reilly, 168
N. Y. 585, 60 N. E. 1110 (1901) (Conveyance to wife in consideration of marriage, but with fraudulent intention on part of the husband, held valid, since wife
was ignorant of fraud).
1(1) In many cases marriage was not the entire consideration. Turner v.
Warren, 160 Pa. 336, 28 AtI. 781 (1894) (wife agreed to devise marriage portion back to husband after marriage) ; Metz v. Blackburn, 9 Wyo. 481, 65 Pac.
857 (1901) (ranch conveyed to wife in consideration of marriage and her promise to educate husband's minor son). (2) In others there was no question of
default in marriage vows, and the precise issue was not squarely presented. Leib
v. Dabriver, 60 Misc. Rep. 866, 111 N. Y. Supp. 650 (1903) (promise to pay
$2,000 if promisee married promisor's daughter) ; Arnold v. Estis, 92 N. C. 163
(1885) (deed from father to daughter and her intended husband as inducement to the marriage); (3) But a few of the cases have passed directly on
the issue. Sidney v. Sidney, 3 P. Wins. 269, 24 Eng. Rep. 1060 (1734) (specific
performance granted wife who deserted husband and lived in adultery with another) ; Barnes v. Barnes, 110 Cal. 420, 42 Pac. 904 (1895) ; Jackson v. Jackson,
222 Ill. 46, 78 N. E. 19 (1906) ; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, 134 Md. 330, 92 Atl. 891,
Ann. Cas. 1916D, 988 (1914).
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comprises a continuing obligation,6 and that mere performance of the
ceremony does not translate an antenuptial contract into a unilateral
undertaking by the husband.7 Such cases define marriage as a mutual agreement for cohabitation in which "each party has a right to
the society and services of the other, and if these are refused the marriage rights and duties are thereby disregarded and violated." 8 The desirability of applying the second definition in a case like the present is apparent, since the logic of the first would lead to the absurdity of allowing the wife to depart with the husband's property immediately after
performance of the marriage ritual.
But even accepting the contention that marriage means nothing
more than mere submission to the rites, there was in the present contract express embodiment of the additional consideration that defendant
should care for the husband as long as both lived.9 One may question the validity and necessity of classifying this promise broadly as
a condition subsequent, since no condition appeared in the deed,10 no
stipulation was made in the oral contract that a violation should permit rescission,"1 and no acts were done from which a condition might
be implied in fact. But it may be justifiably regarded as a condition
implied by law,12 for the promise to perform services was such a substantial part of the contract that "the parties would have intended it
to operate as such' 3 if they had thought about it at all, and justice
requires that it should so operate."'1 4 Under this construction the
court would not be bound to grant rescission,' 5 as it would be if the
'York v. Ferner, 59 Iowa 487, 13 N. W. 630 (1882); Veeder v. Veeder,
195 Iowa 587, 192 N. W. 409, 29 A. L. R. 191 (1923) ; Judd v. Judd, 192 Mich.
198, 158 N. W. 948 (1916), rehearing denied, 160 N. W. 548 (1916) (after conveyance wife obtained divorce pro confesso while in another state).
' New Jersey Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Parker, 85 N. J. Eq. 557, 96
Atl. 574 (1916).
'York v. Ferner, 59 Iowa 487, 13 N. W. 630 (1882).
'Supra, note 2.
"An estate on condition subsequent cannot be created by a deed having no
tlause of forfeiture, reverter, or re-entry. Hall v. Quinn, 190 N. C. 326, 130
S. E. 18 (1925). An oral condition is nugatory. Adams v. Logan County, 11
Ill. 339 (1849).
'Although an oral condition cannot be created to work a reverter or forfeit
an estate, the parties to a contract may provide that certain happenings shall
justify rescission of that contract. Nashville and Northwestern Railroad Co. v.
Jones, 42 Tenn. 404 (1865).
" The reason for such implication is clearly set out in Bank of Columbia v.
Hagner, 26 U. S. 455, 464, 7 L. ed. 219, 223 (1828) : "A different construction
would in many cases lead to the greatest injustice, and a purchaser might have
payment of the consideration enforced upon him, and yet be disabled from procuring the property for which he paid it . . . The seller ought not to be compelled to part with his property without receiving the consideration."
1 i. e., a condition subsequent.
u"Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contracts (1919) 28 YAaE L. J. 739, 744.
See also, BLACX, REScISSION AND CANCELLATION (1916) §213.
""The law having imposed the condition, irrespective of the will of the
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condition were express. 16 But such relief is usually granted where
it would be inequitable to deny it, and especially where there is an
element of fraud.
In holding that the plaintiff could not restore the status quo, the
court probably referred to his inability to return the defendant to an
17
unmarried state, though the decision is inarticulate on this point.
The statement, in the opinion, of the general rule that a party is not
entitled to rescission when unable to restore the status quo, is accurate,' 8 but its applicability here is questionable. As well recognized as the rule itself, is the exception that where the inability results from no act of the plaintiff, the relief should be granted if called
for by the facts,' 9 particularly if the impossibility results from the
fault, fraud, or wrongful conduct of the defendant.2 0 A New York
case 2 1 illustrates both the force and relevancy of the exception. Before marriage the husband had by duress induced the wife to execute
deeds to them as tenants by entirety of certain real estate. In the
wife's suit for cancellation, the husband, setting up the general rule,
denied that the wife was entitled to cancellation because the marriage
could not be annulled. The court overruled this defense on the ground
that the impossibility was occasioned by the defendant's fraud, and that
he could not set up the results of his own wrong to prevent rescission
22
by the innocent plaintiff.
parties, it can deal with the creation as it pleases."

2 WIlwSroN, CoNTrAcrs

(1920) §669. But the only purpose of creating the fiction is rationalzation of
relief, and rescission should logically follow.
The intention of the parties must be carried out unless against public policy. Schumann V. Mark, 35 Minn. 379, 28 N. W. 927 (1886); Carney v.
Barnes, 56 W. Va. 581, 49 S. E. 423 (1904).
' In Jackson v. Jackson, 222 Ill. 46, 78 N. E. 19 (1906) the court said "the
husband is not now in position to reclaim the land, as he cannot restore the
appellee to the unmarried state in which he found her at the time of the conveyance."
IAndrews v. Hensler, 72 U. S. 254, 18 L. ed. 737 (1867) ; May v. Loomis,
140 N. C. 350, 52 S. E. 728 (1905) ; Bolick v. Prudential Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 144,
156, 173 S. E. 320, 327 (1934).
"Thachrah v. Haas, 119 U. S. 499, 7 Sup. Ct. 311, 30 L. ed. 486 (1886);
See also
Payne v. Hiram Lindsey Co., 71 Wash. 293, 128 Pac. 678 (1912).
BLACK, op. cit., supra, note 14, §618; 3 WILLIsToN, op. cit., supra, note 15, §1530.

' Consumers Coal and Fuel Co. v. Yarborough, 194 Ala. 482, 69 So. 897 (1915) ;
Felt v. Bell, 205 Ill. 213, 68 N. E. 794 (1903) ; Paquin v. Milliken, 163 Mo. 79,
63 S. W. 417, 1092 (1901); Hammond v. Pennock, 61 N. Y. 145 (1874); Liland
v. Truets, 19 N. D. 551, 125 N. W. 1032 (1910); Hilton v. Advance Thresher
Co., 8 S. D. 412, 66 N. W. 816 (1896).
'Ring v. Ring, 127 App. Div. 411, 111 N. Y. Supp. 713 (1908), aff'd, 199
N. Y. 574, 93 N. E. 1130 (1910).
'The court quoted, Masson v. Bault, 1 Denio 69 (N. Y., 1845), as follows:
"If, therefore, he has so entangled himself in the meshes of his own knavish
plot that the party defrauded cannot unloose him, the fault is his own, and the
law only requires that the injured party restore what he has received, and as
far as he can, undo what has been done in the execution of the contract. ...
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At most the principal case means one of two things: (1) that
under the most favorable view of the evidence plaintiff failed to show
fraud, or (2) that even though fraud were proved plaintiff was not
entitled to rescission because of inability to restore the status quo. If
it be the first, one can only question the result in view of the evidence
in the record tending to show fraud.23 If it be the second, there is
good authority in North Carolina for the general proposition, 24 but
the narrow question now presented has heretofore never been decided
in this jurisdiction.2 5 It is suggested that under the rules reviewed
aboVe the court might well have recognized an exception.
On the merits of his case the plaintiff seems entitled to some sort
of relief.26 But since the contract was oral legal redress is inaccessible.27 A possible alternative is cancellation for failure of consideration. 28 Partial failure of consideration is not ordinarily a ground for
rescission, 29 and the rule is inflexible where full compensation may 'be
That is all honesty and fair dealing requires of him. If this fail to extricate
the wrongdoer from the position he has assumed, it is in no sense the fault
of the intended victim, and whatsoever consequences may follow should rest
on his head alone."
' Supra, note 1. Under the decisions of this state, upon motion to dismiss,
"if there is more than a scintilla of evidence tending to prove plaintiff's contention, it must be submitted to the jury, who alone can pass on the weight of
the evidence." Cox v. Norfolk & C. R. Co., 123 N. C. 604, 31 S. E. 848 (1898) ;
Gates v. Max, 125 N. C. 139, 34 S. E. 266 (1899); Lamb v. Perry, 169 N. C.
436, 86 S. E. 179 (1915); Campbell v. Washington Light and Power Co., 171
N. C. 768, 88 S. E. 630 (1916); Nowell v. Barnsight, 185 N. C. 142, 116 S. E.
87 (1923). See also McINTosH, loc. cit. supra, note 3.
May v. Loomis, 140 N. C. 350, 52 S. E. 728 (1906) ; Brown v. Osteeji, 197
N. C. 305, 14 S. E. 434 (1929) ; Bolick v. Life Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 144, 173 S. E.
320 (1934).
' Search reveals only two holdings squarely on the point: Barnes v. Barnes,
110 Cal. 420, 42 Pac. 904 (1895)
(where the marriage relationship had been
maintained for seven years) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 222 Ill.
46, 78 N. E. 19 (1906).
'That a wife in default on marriage contract should not be allowed to retain
property settled upon her in consideration of marriage, irrespective of fraud,
seems to have been recognized by the N. C. Legislature.
N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1935) §2523. "If a married woman . . . wilfully or without just
cause abandon her husband and refuses to live with him, and is not living with
her husband at his death . . . she shall thereby lose . . . all right and estate
in the property of her husband settled upon her upon the sole consideration of
marriage, before or after marriage."
' An ordinary action for damages is barred by the statute of frauds, and
chance for recovery in an action for fraud and deceit is entirely speculative,
since deemed to be based on affirmance of the contract.
Several states have expressly provided by statute that a party to a contract may rescind the same where the consideration for his obligation fails in
whole or in part. CAL. CIrv. CODE (Deering, 1931) §1689; MONT. REV. CODE
(Choate, 1921) §7565; N. D. Comp. LAws AmN. (1913) §5934; OIMA. CoMP.
STAT. Azx. (1910) §5077; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929)
§904. For construction
of statute see Sterling v. Gregory, 149 Cal. 117, 85 Pac. 305 (1906) ; Conlin v.
Osborn, 161 Cal. 659, 120 Pac. 755 (1911).
'Peale v. Marion Coal Co., 190 Fed. 376 (C. C. M. D. Pa., 1911); Perry v.
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obtained in damages.8 0 But the rule has been relaxed and relief
granted where the exigencies of the particular case seem to so demand. 81
Since the trial these remedial difficulties have been simplified. It
appears that plaintiff's death pending appeal brought the case within a
statute enabling recovery of marriage settlements from a wife in default on the marriage contract at the time of her husband's death. 82
An action on the statute by the personal representative of the deceased
plaintiff is not res adjudicataby the non-suit in the principal case, notwithstanding the former was made party plaintiff in the appeal. A
cause of action on the statute arose only at the death of the husband
and could not be set up by amendment to an action instituted by the
PAUL F. MICKEY.
deceased himself.33
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Privileges and Immunities
of Federal Citizenship.
In Colgate v. Harvey,1 a Vermont statute imposing, on the citizens
of that state, an income tax on interest from loans bearing interest at
five per centum or less, but providing that the act should not apply to
any loans made within the state, was held unconstitutional as being
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The court held that the exemption of loans made within the state was a
denial of the "equal protection clause" 2 because the exemption was unreasonable and arbitrary, it had no substantial relation to the object of
the statute, and, as a practical matter, exempted loans made within the
state might be invested elsewhere. The court went further to proclaim
that the privilege of acquiring and owning investments outside the state
and receiving income therefrom was a privilege of federal citizenship
Quackenbush, 105 Cal. 299, 38 Pac. 740 (1894); Selby v. Hutchison, 9 Ill. 319
(1847) ; Miller v. Phillips, 31 Pa. St. Rep. 218 (1858).
'Gatlin v. Wilcox, 26 Ark. 309 (1870).
'Aubrey v. Clark, 148 U. S. 345, 13 Sup. Ct. 617, 37 L. ed. 475 (1892) ; Gatlin
v. Wilcox, 26 Ark. 309 (1870); Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Marsh, 20 Colo.
22, 36 Pac. 799 (1894) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 259 Ill. 524, 102 N. E. 1086 (1913) ; Williams v. Butler, 58 Ind. App. 47, 105 N. E. 387, rehearing denied, 52 Ind. App, 47,
107 N. E. 300 (1914); Mason v. Baret, 1 Denio 69 (N. Y. 1845); Callonon v.
Powers, 199 N, Y. 268, 92 N. E. 747 (1910).
1 Supra note 26. In the only case applying the statute since enactment, it was
construed very strictly against the wife [Phillips v. Wiseman, 131 N. C. 402, 42
S. E. 861 (1902)]. It seems that only a distorted interpretation by reading in
equitable doctrines discussed in this note could defeat its operation in a case like
the present.
'Bolick v. Southern R. Co., 138 N. C. 412, 50 S. E, 689 (1905).
'56 Sup. Ct. 252, 80 L. ed. 225 (1935).
,,. .. nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
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guaranteed by Section 1 of the same Amendment, and that the tax
would be invalid as abridging this privilege, even if not discriminatory.
The court's interpretation of the clause which forbids state abridgement of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States is
a startling innovation. The interpretation not only stands alone without precedent, but is also in conflict with prior decisions.
Shortly after the termination of the Civil War and the emancipation
of the negroes, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution of the United States. 4 At that time, there was no real reason for
the creation of further rights, and the purpose of the "privileges and
immunities clause" was doubtless an effort to extend citizenship and to
broaden the scope of its benefits to a greater number of persons, rather
than to enhance citizenship or to vary the quality of rights. The first
and leading interpretation of the clause herein discussed was set forth
in the Slaughter-House Cases.5 Since that decision, the clause has been
so narrowly construed that it has merely served citizens by furnishing an
additional guaranty of those privileges and immunities which they had
prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 i.e., it made express
the protection of those rights which had previously existed by implication. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are those inherent in the very nature
and character of our national government-the provisions of its Constitution, and laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof. 7 These
*"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . ." This provision is
not to be confused with U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, §2, providing, "The citizens

of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States. ..." It is well established that this clause affords a citizen no
protection as to action by his own state. Thus it has no application to the principal case.
' Proposed by Congress June 13, 1866. Effectively ratified July 9, 1868.
183 U. S. 36, 21 L. ed. 394 (1873).
8 See id. at 96, 21 L. ed. at 415, Mr. Justice Field dissenting stated if the
clause, ".

.

. only refers, as held by the majority' of the court in their opinion, to

such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specifically designated
in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United
States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most
unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage." Minor v. Happersett, 88 U. S. 162, 171, 22 L. ed. 627, 629 (1874) ; United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U. S. 542, 554, 23 L. ed. 588, 592 (1875) ; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S.436, 448,
10 Sup. Ct 930, 934, 34 L. ed. 519, 524 (1889) ; In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116,
117, 14 Sup. Ct. 1082, 1083, 38 L. ed. 929, 930 (1893).
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U. S.36, 72-74, 77-80, 21 L. ed. 394, 407-410
(1873) ; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S.436, 448, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 934, 34 L. ed. 519,
524 (1889) ; McPherson v. Blocker, 146 U. S. 1, 38, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 11, 36 L. ed.
869, 878 (1892) ; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S.657, 661, 13 Sup. Ct 721, 723, 37
L. ed. 599, 601 (1892) ; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S.377, 382, 14 Sup. Ct 570,
571, 572, 38 L. ed. 485, 487 (1893); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 286, 22 Sup.
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privileges and immunities embody the right to assemble for the purpose
of petitioning Congress for the redress of a grievance,8 to vote for a
member of Congress and presidential electors without race discrimina1
tion, 9 to establish homesteads by remaining on unoccupied public land, "
to be protected from unlawful violence while in the custody of a United
States marshal,1 1 and to inform the authorities of the United States
as to the violation of its laws. 12 These rights, however, were declared
by the Supreme Court in the determination of federal prosecutions
against individuals for conspiracy to invade the civil rights of citizens
of the United States, 12' and not in actions contesting the validity of
state statutes. The Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable in these
cases, for by its express provisions, it applies only to action by a state.
Prior to the instant case, forty-four cases have been brought before
the Supreme Court in which state statutes were assailed on the grounds
that they infringed on the "privileges and immunities clause," 18 and yet
the court has not found an abridgement in a single instance. Among
the statutes involved were those requiring students of a state university
to complete a course in military science, and tactics,' 4 prohibiting
Greek-letter fraternities or other societies in state educational institutions,1 5 forbidding possession 16 or sale 17 of intoxicating liquors, denyCt. 213, 217, 46 L. ed. 196, 201 (1901) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97,
29 Sup. Ct. 14, 19, 53 L. ed 97, 105'(1908) ; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525,

537, 538, 40 Sup. Ct. 2, 5, 63 L. ed. 1124, 1130 (1919) ; Ownbey v. Morgan, 256
U. S. 94, 131, 41 Sup. Ct. 433, 438, 65 L. ed. 837, 846 (1920) ; Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 539, 42 Sup. Ct. 516, 520, 66 L. ed. 1044, 1052 (1921);
Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 261, 55; Sup. Ct. 197, 203, 79 L. ed. 343, 352
(1934); Note (1891) 14 L. R. A. 579. The United States can only grant and
secure to its citizens those rights which are expressly or by reasonable implication
placed under its jurisdiction.

"United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588 (1875) (indictment

against an individual for conspiracy).
9Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. ed. 274 (1883)

(conspiracy); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 21 Sup. Ct. 17, 45 L. ed. 84 (1900).
" United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, 5 Sup. Ct. 36, 28 L. ed. 673 (1884)
(conspiracy).
"1Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 36 L. ed. 429 (1891)
(conspiracy).
"It re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 15 Sup. Ct. 959, 39 L. ed. 1080 (1894) (conspiracy).
'"35 STAT. 1092 (1909) ; 18 U. S. C. A. §51 (1927).
"See cases cited in Colgate v. Harvey, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 266, n. 2, 80 L. ed.
225, 242, n. 2 (1935).
"Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 55 Sup. Ct. 197, 79 L. ed. 343 (1934).
"Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U. S. 589, 35 Sup. Ct. 720, 59 L. ed. 1131

(1914).

Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 98, 62 L. ed. 304 (1917).
,Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U. S. 129, 21 L. ed. 929 (1873) ; Crawley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L. ed. 620 (1890); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148
U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 721, 37 L. ed. 599 (1892) ; Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446,
26 Sup. Ct. 671, 50 L. ed. 1099 (1905). It is undoubtedly a right of every citizen
1
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ing the right to use the United States' flag for advertising purposes, 18
and requiring segregation of races in conveyances. 19 The court has
21
held further that the right to practice law, 20 the right of suffrage,
and the rights designated under the first eight Amendments were not
22
protected by the clause.
The prerequisite for the application of the clause on numerous occasions has been the pointing out of the provision of the Constitution, or
the laws, or treaty which the statute violated ;23 a mere contention that
a privilege or immunity was violated was deemed too general. 24 Such
a rule accounts for the uncontradicted inapplicability of the clause.
Since the single fact that the Constitution and laws of the United
States created a privilege or granted an immunity was, of itself, sufficient to put the privilege or immunity beyond the reach of unfriendly
state legislation, the pleading of the clause as protection was superfluous, being a resort only when the party aggrieved by a state law
could find no federal guaranty of right based upon a specific provision
of the Constitution but when he felt that an inalienable right had been
violated. Naturally, in these instances, the clause proved of no avail.
It is evident that had the clause herein discussed added constructively
to the substantive privileges and immunities afforded to citizenship prior
to its adoption, the court would have been presented with cases which
involved such infringement, especially when we consider the multiplicity
of state statutes for the past sixty-five years.
The rule of the instant case, no abridged statute having been set
forth, seems extremely undesirable, for as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Stone in his able minority opinion,2 5 ". . . the clause becomes an inof the United States to pursue any lawful trade or business under such restrictions
as are imposed on all persons of the same age, sex, and condition.
Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 27 Sup. Ct. 419, 51 L. ed 696 (1906).

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.537, 16 Sup. Ct 1138, 41 L. ed. 256 (1895).
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U. S.130, 21 L. ed. 442 (1872); lit re Lockwood,
154 U. S.116, 14 Sup. Ct. 1082, 38 L. ed. 929 (1893).
'Minor v. Happersett, 88 U. S. 162, 22 L. ed. 627 (1874).
IBy the unvarying decisions the first eight Amendments to the Constitution of

the United States are restrictive only of national action. See Walker v. Sauvinet,
92 U. S.90, 92, 23 L. ed. 678, 679 (1875) (trial by jury is not a privilege or'
immunity of citizens of the United States) ; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S.252, 266,
6 Sup. Ct. 580, 584, 29 L. ed. 615, 619 (1885) (right to bear arms) ; McElvaine v.
Brush, 142 U. S.155, 158, 12 Sup. Ct 156, 157, 35 L. ed. 971, 973 (1891) (cruel and
unusual punishment) ; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S.581, 606, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 455,
44 L. ed. 597, 602 (1899) (trial by a jury of eight jurors) ; Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S.78, 92, 29 Sup. Ct 14, 19, 53 L. ed. 97, 103 (1908) (exemption
from self-incrimination).
' See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S.252, 266, 6 Sup. Ct. 580, 585, 29 L. ed. 615,
619 (1885).
Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S.446, 26 Sup. Ct. 671, 50 L. ed. 1099 (1905).
Colgate v. Harvey, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 267, 80 L. ed. 225, 237 (1935). Mr.
Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Cardoza concurred in the dissent.
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exhaustible source of immunities, incalculable in their benefit to taxpayers and in their harm to local government, by imposing on the states
the heavy burden of an exact equality of taxation wherever transactions
across state lines may be involved."
S. J. STERN, JR.
Federal Procedure-Conflict of Laws-Conformity to State
Declaration of Its Public Policy.
The plaintiff, a resident of New Jersey, brought suit in the Federal
District Court in New York alleging that the defendant, a resident of
the latter state, had alienated the affections of his wife. The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was contrary to
the public policy of New York as expressed in a statute1 which abolished
the state remedy for alienation of affections. The motion was denied
because the allegations in the complaint did not show that the tort
occurred in New York. The court held that the law of New Jersey
which still permitted such an action 2 would apply if the evidence showed
that the wrong took place in that state because the action was transitory
and governed by the law of the place as distinguished from the law of
the forum.3
It is, of course, elementary that the Rule of Decisions Act 4 requires
federal courts to apply the laws of the state in which they sit and that
such laws were interpreted by Swift v.Tyson 5 as including only statutory and local judge-made law, excluding judge-made general law.
The inquiry in the instant case thus involves a determination of what
laws would be applicable if the suit were brought in a New York state
court and which of these laws would demand conformity under the
classification of Swift v. Tyson. Suit in New York on a foreign cause
'Laws of New York, 1935, c. 263. The statute contains the novel provision

that any person who, as either party or attorney, begins an action barred by the
article shall be guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not less than $1000 or not
more than $5000, or by imprisonment of not less than one year or not more than
five years, or by both fine and imprisonment.
The law of New Jersey is substantially the same as that in force in New
York, but it provided that actions which had already accrued could be brought
within 60 days of the effective date (June 27, 1935) of the statute. Laws of New
Jersey, 1935, c. 279. The suit in the instant case was not barred as it was filed
on August 22, 1935, five days prior to the expiration of the 60 day period.
lWawrzin v. Rosenberg, 12 F. Supp. 548 (E. D. N. Y. 1935). The venue
seems to have been proper since the defendant was a resident of New York. 36
STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §112 (1927).

'1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1927).
641 U. S. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1842). This entire field has been thoroughly and
efficiently covered in several texts. See DoDiE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JuRIsDICTION AND PRocEDuRE (1st ed. 1928) 558-576; 6 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRAcETcE JujIsDIcrroI & PaocEDuRE (1st ed. 1931) 173-314. But cf. Burns Mortgage Co. v.
Fried, 292 U. S.487, 54 Sup. Ct. 813, 78 L. ed. 1380 (1934) (a, significant recent
decision involving a uniform state law).
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of action would involve the familiar rule that a state will not entertain
6
a foreign cause of action contrary to its own public policy. In which
of the categories of Swift v.Tyson this rule would be placed makes no
difference because it is followed in all states. But what of a federal
court's conformity to the state's determination of what is against its
public policy? In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. Co.7 where the Supreme Court was engaged in the construction of
a lease contract, it was said, "Questions of public policy as affecting the
liability for acts done, or upon contracts made and to be performed
within one of the states of the Union,-when not controlled by the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or by the principles
of mercantile or commercial law or of general jurisprudence,8 of national or universal application,-are governed by the laws of the state
as expressed in its own constitution and statutes, or declared by its
highest court." Thus when confronted by a question of policy in connection with a principle of general jurisprudencethe federal courts are
not bound to follow the decisions of the state court. 9- Since a problem
in conflict of laws is regarded as a matter of general law1 0 it would
seem that related questions of policy should not depend upon decisions
of the state courts, and they have been so considered in one group of
cases of which Evey v. Mexican Central Ry. Co."1 is typical. In that
03 BEALE, CO NFLIcT OF LAws (1st ed. 1935) 1647; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF
LAws (1934) §612.
7175 U. S. 91, 100, 20 Sup. Ct. 33, 37, 44 L. ed. 84, 89 (1899).
8

Italics mine.

'Black & White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 273 U. S.690, 47 Sup.
Ct. 472, 71 L. ed. 842 (1928); Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Orange, Va. v. Waugh,
78 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (attorney's fee provision in a note).
" First National Bank of Chicago v. Mitchell, 92 Fed. 565 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1899) (surety contract by married woman) ; Dygert v. Vermont Loan and Trust
Co., 94 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1899) (usurious note) ; Guernsey v. Imperial Bank
of Canada, 188 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911) (manner of giving and sufficiency
of notice of dishonor of a negotiable instrument).
t81 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 5th, 1897). But cf. Mexican Nat'l Ry. Co. v. Slater,
115 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902), aff'd, 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. ed.
900 (1904) (The decision conforms to the Texas rule regarding the enforcement of
actions arising under the Mexican law, and 'while the Evey case is not expressly
overruled, it probably does not constitute applicable law at present.). Other cases
in this group are: Greaves v. Neal, 57 Fed. 816 (C. C. D. Mass. 1893) (assignment for benefit of creditors) ; Dexter v. Edmands, 89 Fed. 467 (C. C. D. Mass.
1898) (case involved Kansas law which imposed -liabilityfor corporate debts upon
stockholders); Lauria v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 241 Fed. 687 (E. D.
N. Y. 1917) (Virginia wrongful death statute; the court formulated the following
rule for measuring policy: "To justify a court in refusing to enforce a right of
action which had accrued under the laws of another on the ground that it contravenes the policy of the forum, it must appear that it is contrary to good morals
or natural justice, or that for some other good reason its enforcement would be
prejudicial to the general interest of the people of the state.") ; Curtis v. Campbell, 76 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1935); cf. Stewart v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 168
U. S. 445, 18 Sup. Ct.105, 42 L. ed. 537 (1897) ; James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage
Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 47 Sup. Ct.308, 71 L. ed. 569 (1926) (action of fraud
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case suit was brought in a federal district court in Texas upon a cause
of action accruing under the Mexican wrongful death statute. However, there is a second group of cases which regard policy as a local
problem concerning -which the state decisions are conclusive. Among
this group is Parker v. Moore12 where the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit followed a decision of the South Carolina Supreme
Court involving a cotton futures contract which, even though valid in
the state where it was made, was held to be unenforceable in South
Carolina for reasons of local public policy. A similar case is Dougherty
v. Gutenstein's in which a federal district court in New York adhered
to a state decision of policy relative to the survivorship of personal
injury actions. In a third group the applicable manifestations of state
policy were considered by the federal courts, but the cases give no
indication as to whether they are conclusive of the issue or not.14
But in the instant case the declaration of policy is made by a statute
rather than a decision. It reads in part as follows: ".

.

. it is hereby

declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests of the
people of the state will be served by the abolition of such remedies....
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to file . . . any process or

pleading, in any court of the state, setting forth or seeking to recover
a sum of money upon any cause of action abolished or barred by this
article, whether such cause arose within or without the state." Since
under the decision of Swift v. Tyson the federal courts must follow
applicable state statutes it would seem that this declaration of public
policy would compel the dismissal of the complaint even though the
based upon a Texas statute which imposed liability upon all persons who received

a benefit from the wrong) ; Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A.
8th, 1931); Jarrett v. Wabash Ry. Co., 57 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932)

(Ontario contributory negligence statute).
=115 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902).
"10 F. Supp. 782 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).

Other cases in this group are: McCue

v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 Fed. 435 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908), rez/d
on other grounds, 223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220, 56 L. ed. 419 (1912) (life insurance policy) ; see Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kempton, 138 Fed. 992 (C. C. A.

9th, 1905) ; Gallagher v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 196 Fed. 1000 (S. D. N. Y.
1912) (Florida wrongful death statute) ; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larussi, 161
Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908); Davis v. Jointless Firebrick Co., 300 Fed. 1, 3
(C. C. A. 9th, 1924) ; Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 51 F. (2d) 992, 996
(C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
"'Texas

& Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905, 36 L. ed,

829 (1892) (state decisions relative to policy are cited and followed) ; Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978, 38 L. ed. 958 (1894)
(a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court was followed, the case having been
tried in a federal court in that state); Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15, 37 Sup.
Ct. 366, 61 L. ed. 565 (1917) (the court mentioned the fact that nc state decisions

or statutes were cited but gave no indication as to what it would have done had

some been supplied); Bradford Elictric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52
Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L. ed. 1026 (1932) ; Gaston v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 266
Fed. 595 (N. D. Ga. 1920) (state decisions were discussed and followed).
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cause of action did arise in New Jersey. 15 Nor should this result be
deterred by such cases as Swett v. Givner' 6 which was decided in 1934
by a United States District Court sitting in Illinois. That was an action
for wrongful death which had occrued in Ontario, and the Illinois
statute prohibited actions in the state courts based upon a death which
occurred in another jurisdiction. The court held that it was not bound
to adhere to the state's policy as expressed in the statute. The cases
may be distinguished on the ground that the Illinois statute does not
contain the explicit declaration of policy found in the New York law.
The principal case may have been predicated, in part, upon the assumption that, as has since been decided by the New York Supreme Court, 17
the New York statute is unconstitutional. That decision went on the
ground that the legislature had no power to abolish a common law
remedy without providing an adequate substitute for meritorious cases.
As to that, the commentators are in conflict.1 s

N. A.

TOwNSEND, JR.

Insurance-Exemption of Disability Payments in Bankruptcy.
L held a life insurance policy to which was attached a supplementary
contract of disability insurance made the same day. L became permanently disabled and was paid, up until he was adjudicated a bankrupt, disability payments to the extent of $174.52 per month. Held,
that the disability payments, except for state statutory exemption of
$40.00 per month, became an asset of the bankrupt's estate; that §7D
(a) of the Bankruptcy Act1 did not exempt these payments, such secSee Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kempton, 138 Fed. 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905)
(the court respected a statute of the lex fori which barred the use in contracts of
a clause restricting the time in which suit might be brought for a breach to a
period less than the statute of limitations) ; Grossman v. Union Trust Co., 228 Fed.
610 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916), aff'd, 245 U. S.412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147, 62 L. ed. 368 (1918).
1

5 F. Supp. 739 (N. D. IlL 1934).

IN. Y. Times, March 1, 1936, §1, at 1. It should be noted that the New York
Supreme Court is a trial court of general jurisdiction.
" Hibschman, Can "Legal Blackmail" Be Legally Outlawed? (1935) 69 U. S. L.
REv. 474; Note (1935) 22 VA.L. REv. 205.
130 STAT. 544, 566 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §110 (1927). "(a) The trustee
of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualification, and his successor or successors, if he shall have one or more, upon his or their appointment
and qualification, shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of
the bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as
it is to property which is exempt, to all . .. (5) property which prior to the
filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or which might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him. When any
bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, within thirty
days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the
trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum
so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy
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tion applying only to legal reserve life insurance with a cash surrender value; that disability insurance did not become life insurance
by being attached to the life policy, the two contracts being executed
as distinct instruments; and that these payments were not after ac2
quired property or future earnings.
The cases dealing with exemption of disability insurance, due to
the fact that such policies have only recently become of common use,
are relatively few in number. A federal court was first confronted
with the question as to whether disability insurance payments passed
to the trustee in the case of In re Matschke,3 in which the court held
that the claim to the payments was property of the bankrupt, the right
to collect which he could have assigned prior to his death, and which
therefore passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. The same question was passed upon again in In re Kern,4 the court holding that the
disability clause in a life policy was in effect an annuity payable to the
bankrupt upon a contingency which had happened, and that it was not
life insurance in any sense of the term, which of course necessitated its
passing to the trustee. The recent case of In re Rechtnman, also
stands for the proposition that disability payments are not exempt
under §70 (a) (5), as well as for the fact that the recent amendment
to the New York Insurance Law,0 specifically exempting disability
insurance, is not retroactive in effect. Therefore, the law is wellestablished that disability insurance is not exempt in the absence of
state legislation to that effect. It makes no difference that the disability clause is a part of the life insurance policy,7 although the lanfree from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his
estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the
trustee as assets."
'Legg v. St. John, 56 Sup. Ct. 336 (1936).
'I& re Matschke, 193 Fed. 284 (E. D. N. Y. 1912) (the bankrupt, stricken
with paralysis in January 1909, died in June of same year, involuntary petition
in bankruptcy being filed in April, 1909. The wife as administratrix received
the proceeds of an insurance policy which by its terms insured the bankrupt
against permanent disability from paralysis. By terms of policy the company
had one year within which to pay the policy if it saw fit. Held, proceeds of the
disability policy matured prior to the bankruptcy and were assets passing to the
trustee).
Iltre Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. N. Y. 1934).
"In re Rechtman, 11 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. N. Y. 1935) (bankrupt guaranteed
payment of all liabilities of a certain corporation and subsequently became entitled to disability insurance payments; it was held that the rights of the creditors accrued upon date of execution of the agreement, and such date being prior
to the date of amendment of New York Insurance Law exempting from creditors' claims disability payments under life policies in favor of insured, the
amendment had no effect unless it was retroactive, which it could not be).
IN. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1934) c. 30, §55b.
'In re Matschke, 193 F. 284 (E.D. N. Y. 1912); In re Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246
(S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; In re Rechtman, 11 F. Supp. 347 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).
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guage of the principal case expresses an inference to the contrary by
emphasizing the fact that here the disability contract was not a part
of the life policy. The common type of argument advanced to support the conclusion that disability payments pass to the trustee ini
bankruptcy is that when Congress enacted the insurance proviso of
§70 (a) (5) in 1898, it did not intend to exempt disability insurance
as incidents of ordinary life insurance policies, since it was not until
much later that policies with this feature became common.8 It is true
that there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Act which indicates the intention of Congress to withhold from the trustee disability payments;9
but on the other hand, one might logically argue that since Congress did
not have in mind this type of insurance it is not an asset intended to
come within the purview of the Act. However, to preclude such an
argument, it has been said1 0 that the Act cannot be construed so narrowly as to exclude any vested interest constituting an asset available
to a creditor merely on the ground that this asset is not expresly enumerated in §70. In other words, the doctrine of "Expressio unius exclusio alterius" does not apply.
In the principal case the court said that the disability payments
were not "after-acquired" property or "future earnings" so as to prevent them from passing to the trustee, the interest being vested presently, and the payment only postponed. It seems to be well established that if the interest is vested so that the bankrupt could have
transferred the same it is not after-acquired property, and passes to
the trustee in 'bankruptcy, even though it is payable in the future."
Wages earned prior to the filing of the petition are not exempt,' 2 and
'In re Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).

'In re Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).

" n re Baudouine, 96 Fed. 536 (S. D. N. Y. 1899).
'In
re Baudouine, 96 Fed. 536 (S. D. N. Y. 1899) (where bankrupt was
beneficiary under a will which gave him rents and profits for life) ; lit re Wright,
157 Fed. 544 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1907) (where bankrupt had a contract having several years to run which entitled him to an interest in renewal premiums subject
to right of the company to terminate); Pollack v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 233
Fed. 861 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) (where bankrupt had a vested remainder in trust
fund after death of holder of present interest) ; Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F. (2d)
725 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1925) (where bankrupt had an unassignable unliquidated claim
against treasury department for refund of excess income tax payments) ; Vellacott v. Murphy, 16 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) (where testamentary trust
was to terminate in ten years at which time bankrupt was to receive certain part

of trust estate). Contra: It re Furness, 75 F. (2d) 965 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935)
(where bankrupt was one of testamentary trustees and had not applied to the
Surrogate for his commission, his right thereto was inchoate until liquidated under
New York law).

'lit re Wright, 157 Fed. 544 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1907) (where bankrupt was en-

titled to an interest in renewal premiums when collected, on policies previously

written, but premiums had not yet been collected) ; In re Evans, 253 Fed. 276
(W. D. Tenn. 1918)

(where bankrupt received increased wages by virtue of
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if there is only a possibility of payment for services rendered up to
the time of petition, though the sum is to be subsequently paid, the
claim passes to the trustee, 13 it being what is termed a possibility connected with an interest.' 4 However, if the wages are earned in the
future, they are exempt.' 5
It seems, however, that since disability payments are in lieu of
wages, the court might have fairly construed those payments accruing
in the future to be in the nature of future earnings. Such a conclusion would only be consonant with the policy argument that exemption
statutes should be liberally construed to protect the bankrupt's family
and dependents, 16 and to prevent such 'burden from falling upon the
public.' 7 An analogy is found in the statement of Justice Cardozo' s that benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act were a
substitute for wages during whole or at least part of the term of dis-

ability.
Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act,' 9 provides in substance that all
property exempted by virtue of state legislation does not pass to the
trustee in case of bankruptcy. Various types of insurance exemptions
20
Some of the states2 1
have been established in the several states.
promise made before, but considered after, bankruptcy) ; In re Brown, 4 F. (2d)
806 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1924).
"In re Brown, 4 F. (2d) 806 (C.C. A. 2nd, 1924). Receiver of a corporation performed two-thirds of his work before becoming bankrupt, and was paid
after date of adjudication. Held, that two-thirds of the amount paid passed to
the trustee; that though a receiver has no right of claim of compensation prior
to termination of proceedings in which he is receiver, there was a possibility of
payment for services rendered up to time of petition in bankruptcy.
" Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S.529, 543, 11 Sup. Ct. 885, 888, 35 L. ed. 550,
556 (1890). Contra: In re Furness, 75 F. (2d) 965 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935).
'In re Karns, 148 Fed. 143 (S.D. Ohio 1905) ; Progress Bldg. & Loan Co. v.
Hall, 220 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) ; In re Green, 213 Fed. 542 (E.D. N. Y.
1914); In re Brown, 4 F. (2d) 806 (C.C. A. 2nd, 1924).
"it re Newberger, 1 F. Supp. 685 (W. D. Ohio 1917) [where it was said
courts encourage a reasonable amount of insurance for the protection of one's
family. (The same argument should apply to disability insurance, for a person
permanently disabled cannot care for his family if he has no other income)];
In re Welch, 8 F. Supp. 838 (D. N. D. 1934) ; In re O'Pava, 235 Fed. 729 (N. D.
Iowa 1916).
'7In re Hewit, 244 Fed. 245 (N. D. Ohio 1917).
' Surace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18, 161 N. E. 315 (1928). There it was said
rehabilitation of man, not the payment of his ancient debts, was the theme of the
statute, and its animating motive.
'p30 STAT. 548 (1898), 28 U. S. C. A. §24 (1926). "The provisions of this
title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are
prescribed by the state laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition
in the state wherein they have had their domicile for six months or the greater
portion thereof immediately preceding the filing of the petition."
o(a) Some states exempt the proceeds of life policies in one or more of the
following instances: where payable (sometimes expressly where assigned) to
wife, to widow, to husband, to married woman, to child, or to dependents. ALA.
CoDE (Michie, 1928) §8277 (for benefit of wife or children, if annual
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premium does not exceed $1,000; and if premium exceeds $1,000 then proportionate exemption); ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §1738 (13) (payable to a
surviving wife or child, not exceeding $10,000) ; IowA CODE (1935) §8776 (payable to surviving widow, not to exceed $5,000) ; MASS. LAWS ANN. (1933) C.
175, §126 (for benefit of wife or children) ; MICH. CmP. LAWS (1929) §12452
(for benefit of married woman on which annual premium does not exceed $300) ;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §9447 (14) (payable to wife or child not exceeding $10,000) ; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §5736 (taken out by' a married woman on
any person provided she pays premiums out of her own property); Mo. Ray.
STAT. (1929) §5739 (for benefit of wife; but annual premiums not to exceed
$500); N. H. Pub. Laws (1931) c. 175 (payable to married woman); N. J.
CoMP. STAT. (1910) p. 2850, §39 (payable to married woman); N. C. CoNsT.,
art. X, §7 (for benefit of wife and children) ; S. C. CODE (1932) §7985 (payable
to married woman; annual premium must not exceed $500); S. D. ComP. LAWS
(1929) §9310, as amended by Public Laws of 1931, c. 170 (payable or assigned
to husband, wife, or child, proceeds not to exceed $5,000).
(b) Where the proceeds of an annuity or life policy are retained by the company under terms of the policy or a supplemental agreement any principal or interest paid thereunder is exempt, in some states, from creditors of the insured,
if the policy or supplemental agreement so provides. COLO. AiN. STAT. (Mills,
1930) §3606; MASS. LAWS ANN. (1933) c. 175, §119A; VT. PuB. LAWS (1933),
tit. 31, c. 277, §7014.
(c) In the following states policies by a person on his own life, or life of
another, in favor of a person other than himself are exempt in favor of beneficiary as against creditors of the insured or person effecting same, whether or not
right to change beneficiary has been reserved: Ala. Gen. Acts (1932) No. 160;
ARx. ANN. STAT. (Castle, Supp. 1931) §5989a; Del. Pub. Laws (1931) c. 52.
(d) In the following states benefits under policies held with health and accident companies are exempt from debts and liabilities of policy holder or beneficiary: ARx. ANN. STAT. (Castle, Supp. 1927) §5989; GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison,
1933) §56-1007; IowA CODE (1935) §8776 (benefits not to exceed $15,000) ; NEB.
Comp. STAT. (Supp. 1933) §44-1130); VA. CODE (Michie, 1935) §4219; WASH.
REv. STAT. ANY. (Remington, 1932) §569.
(e) Oklahoma exempts policies held with industrial companies: OKLA. ComP.
STAT. (Supp. 1926) §6908-9.
(f) Idaho exempts benefits of policy on life of debtor if he is head of a family: IDAHO CODE (1932) §8-204 (annual premiums must not exceed $250).
(g) The following states exempt benefits paid by mutual and assessment companies from debts of policy holder: Anx. ANN. STAT. (Castle, Supp. 1927) §6016k
(but total benefits must not exceed $1,000) ; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §5752; NEV.
ComP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §3593.
(h) Some states exempt the proceeds of endowment policies in one or more
of the following instances: where payable to assured, to beneficiary other than
person taking the policy, to husband, to wife, or to dependent relatve. IowA
CODE (1935) §8776 (payable to assured) ; MAsS. LAWS ANN. (1933) c. 175, §125
(payable to beneficiary other than person taking policy) ; OHIO CODE (Baldwin,
Supp. Sept., 1933) §9394 (payable to wife, child, or any dependent relative) ; S. D.
ComP. LAWS (1929) §9310, as amended by Public Laws of 1931, c. 170 (payable
to assured, but total benefits must not exceed $5,000).
(i) The following states exempt cash surrender value of life policies from
claims of creditors of insured: FLA. ComP. LAWS (1927) §7066; MICH. ComP.
LAWS (1929) §12451; MIss. CODE ANN. (1930) §1756; N. D. ComP. LAWS (19131925) §8718a; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §46-514.
(j) Exemption of casualty insurance was found in the following states: M.
REv. STAT. (1930) c. 60, §173; MIcE. Comp. LAWS (1929) §12470; R. I. Ga.
LAWS (1923) c. 261, §20.
(k) In the following states exemption of annuities was found in one or more
of the following instances: where for benefit of wife, of child, of dependent, of
creditor, or of annuitants. OHIO CODE (Bald-win, Supp. Sept, 1933) §9394 (for
benefit of wife, child, dependent, or creditor) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
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have included among their exemptions disability insurance. Of these
disability exemption statutes, New York takes probably the most liberal view and makes no limitation as to the amount of such payments
and subjects the proceeds thereof only to payment for necessaries contracted for after the commencement of the disability. 22

The California

legislature assumed an intermediate position and limited the maximum amount that could be paid to the insured as well as subjected
one-half of that amount to any debts incurred by the beneficiary, his
wife, or family for necessaries. 23 The most conservative viewpoint is
tit. 40, §515, as amended P. L. 1935, No. 337, §1 (a contract of annuity not to

exceed $100 per month for benefit of annuitants) ; TENN. CoDE (Shannon, 1932)
§8458 (for benefit of wife, ctiild or dependent relative).
(1) The following states provide for the exemption of group insurance: COLO.
ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) §36061; Ind. Acts (1935) c. 162, §168; MAss. LAWS
ANN. (1933) c. 175, §135; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6466 (d); OHIO
CODE (Baldwin, Supp. June, 1935) §9426-4; PA. STAT. Am. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 40, §534.
(m) The following states provide for the exemption of benefits from fraternal
benefit societies: ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §8478; ARK. STAT. ANN. (Castle,
Supp. 1927) §6069g; Aiz. REV. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §1738 (15); CONN.
GEN. STAT. (1930) §4269; GA. CODE (Harrison, 1933) §46-213; Ind. Pub. Acts
(1935) c.162, §196; IowA CODE (1935) §8796; KAN. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1933)
c.40, §414; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §681c-21; LA. GEN. STAT. (1932) §4155;
ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c.61, §17; MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, 1924) art. 49A,
§167; MicH. ComP. LAws (1929) §12499; M.NqN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §9447
(15); MONT.R.v.'CoDE (Choate, 1921) §6326; Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) §6011;
N. H. Pum. LAws (1926) c.283, §117; N. J. ComP. STAT. (1709-1900) p.200,
§19; N. M. CODE ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §71-321; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §6510; OY.LA. ComP. STAT. ANN. (Bunn, 1921) §6786; R. I. GEN. LAWS
(1923) c. 261, §20; TEx. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1926) §4847; UTAH REV. STAT.
(1933) §43-9-34; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington,1932) §7279; Wyo. REv. STAT.

(1931)

46-121.

(n) Cal. Amend. to Stat. and Codes (1935) c. 723, §19 (690.19) (benefits on
any life policy on which annual premium does not exceed $500; if premium exceeds $500 then proportionate exemption).
'Ark. Acts (1933) No. 102; Cal. Amend. to Stat. and Codes (1935) c. 723,
§20 (690.20); Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) §1755, as amended by Public Laws 1932,
c.138; NEB. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1933) tit 44, §1130; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit.
40, §766; Wis. Laws (1935) c.492, §1.
IN. Y. CoN. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1934) c.30, §55-b. "No money or other
benefit paid, provided or allowed to be paid, provided or allowed by any stock
or mutual life,
health or casualty insurance corporation on account of disability
from injury or sickness of any insured person shall be liable to execution, attachment, garnishment, or other process or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or
applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt
or liability of such insured person whether such debt or liability was incurred before or after the commencement of such disability, but this section shall not affect
the assignability of any such disability benefit otherwise assignable, nor shall
this section apply to any money income disability benefit in an action to recover
for necessaries.
I Cal. Stat. and Amend. to the Codes (1935) c. 723, §20 (690.20) "All moneys,
benefits, privileges, or immunities, accruing or in any manner growing out of any
disability or health insurance, if the annual premiums do not exceed five hundred
dollars, and if they exceed that sum like exemption shall exist which shall bear the
same proportion to the moneys, benefits, privileges, and immunities so accruing or
growing out of such insurance that said five hundred dollars bears to the whole;
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expressed by the Wisconsin statute, which limits 24the total benefits to
be paid to one hundred and fifty dollars per month.
It is submitted that the same public policy that induced the states
to make the widespread exemptions of life insurance as set forth in
footnote 20 below, and which moved the courts to encourage the taking of such insurance, should likewise lead to exemption of the proceeds of disability policies. Payments under these policies take the
place of earnings, and come at a time when they are even more needed
than normal earnings. Future earnings are exempt; so should these disability payments be exempt. The present decision precludes a construction of the Bankruptcy Act making such an exemption; therefore,
the exemption must come through state legislation. Furthermore,
the payments should be free from ordinary process brought by creditors. For these reasons it is urged that North Carolina and other
states join in the movement for such exemptions by passing legislation similar to that of New York, California or Wisconsin, depending
upon the extent to which each state desires to go in making the exemptions.
STATON P. WILLIAMS.
Mortgages-Subrogation-Payment Under a Mistake of Fact
By Party Not Liable.
Husband and wife were joint owners of a tract of land on which
they executed two mortgages. The husband died, and the widow attempted to sell the entire tract to Johnson in consideration of his assuming the mortgages and paying her the difference between the value of
the land and amount of the two mortgages. The record indicated the
joint ownership, but apparently Johnson was ignorant of the fact. He
subsequently paid the mortgages, and afterwards the heirs of deceased
husband brought this bill for partition. John sought subrogation to the
rights of the mortgagees so as to be able to require petitioners to pay
one-half of the mortgages before being granted the partition. The
court refused to allow the subrogation on the ground that his assumption
of the debt had made him primarily liable. 1
Subrogation, not being dependent upon contract, is a creature of
but where debts are incurred by the beneficiary of such policy, or his wife or family
for the common necessaries of life, one half of such 'benefits, privileges, or immunities so accruing is nevertheless subject to execution, garnishment or attachment to satisfy debts so incurred."
Wis. Laws (1935) c. 492, §1. "All sums due or to become due and payable or
paid to any person by any life insurance company or association, for partial, total,
temporary or permanent disability under any contract or policy of insurance, but
not exceeding one hundred fifty dollars per month."
IDuke et al. v. Kilpatrick et al., 163 So. 640 (Ala. 1935).
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2
equity and was invented to do substantial justice between the parties.
The principle was created as a means of placing one who has paid the
8
For example:
obligation of another in the position of a creditor.
realty, such
on
encumbrance
outstanding
an
Where one has discharged
of
record of
lien
being released of record, and there is a subsequent
which he had no actual knowledge, the party so paying usually asks
equity to revive the encumbrance discharged and subrogate him to the
position of the first encumbrance holder in order that he may gain
4
priority over the subsequent lien.
A majority of the courts are committed to the view set forth in the
instant case.5 These jurisdictions state that equitable subrogation will
only be granted where: (1) the party paying occupied the position of a
surety; or (2) the payment was made under an agreement with the
debtor or creditor that he should receive and hold an assignment of the
debt as security; or (3) the party paying stood in such a relation to the
encumbered premises that his interest could not otherwise be sufficiently
protected. 6
There is, however, a strong line of authority which will not deny
relief to the party who seeks subrogation merely because he had assumed
and paid a debt upon which he was not liable." For example: Where
X, the purchaser of Blackacre, assumed and later paid a first mortgage
296

'Dothan Grocery v. Dowling et al., 204 Ala. 224, 85 So. 489 (1920) ("subrogation is a mode which equity adopts to compel ultimate discharge of a debt
by him who in equity and good conscience ought to -pay it, nor is it dependent on
-privity or contractual relations") ; Moring v. Privott, 146 N. C. 558, 60 S. E. 509
; Huggins v. Fitzpatrick, 102 W: Va. 224, 135 S. . 19 (1926).
(1908)
3
Ibid.
Prestridge v. Lazar, 132 Miss. 168, 95 So. 837 (1923) (allowed subrogation
as the &debt should have, in equity, been satisfied by another).
'Storer v. Warren et al., 98 Ind. 616, 192 N. E. 325 (1934) ; Goodyear v.
Goodyear, 72 Iowa 329, 33 N. W. 142 (1887) (basing decision further on fact
that party who assumed and paid had constructive notice of the junior lien);
Smith v. Feltner, 259 Ky. 833, 83 S. W. (?d) 506 (1935) ; 2 JoNEs, MORTGA ES
(8th ed. 1923) §1119; PomExoy, Equrir JURISPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) §797
[".

. .

The rule (against subrogation) also applies to a grantee of the mortgagor

who takes a conveyance of land subject to the mortgage and expressly assumes
and promises to pay it as a part of the consideration. He is thereby made the
principal debtor....
8

If he pays off the mortgage it is extinguished."].

Wilkins v. Gibson, 113 Ga. 31, 38 S. E. 374 (1901) (facts fell within the rule
as junior encumbrancer discharged senior encumbrancer, to protect his interest);
Home Savings Bank of Chicago et al. v. Bierstadt, 168 Ill. 618, 48 N. E. 161
(1897) (subrogation allowed due to agreement by lender with mortgagor that
-ender was to get first lien, he being ignorant of a second lien) ; Kuhn v. National
Bank, 74 Kan. 456, 87 Pac. 551 (1906) (where there was assumption of mortgage,
court refused subrogation as no interest to protect and no agreement).
7 Matzen v. Shaeffer, 65 Cal. 81, 3 Pac. 92 (1884)
(purchaser at execution
sale assumed mortgage) ; Tibbetts v. Terrill et al., 26 Colo. A. 64, 140 Pac. 936
(1914), Note (1915) 15 Cor. L. REv. 171; Williams v. Libby, 118 Me. 80, 105
AtI. 855 (1919) (problem of constructive notice discounted as assuming grantee
was sick); Dixon v. Morgan, 154 Tenn. 389, 285 S. W. 558 (1926) ; Note (1925)
37 A. L. R. 384.
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on the land without knowledge of a recorded junior lien, X will be
subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whom he paid, and his mort8
gage will be prior to that of the junior lienor. These courts reason
that the mortgage was assumed and discharged while the grantee was
laboring under a mistake of fact; i.e., the assuming grantee, ignorant
of the subsequent encumbrance, believed he was assuming the only
mortgage. They add that equity will grant relief when an obligation
9
or transaction has arisen from a mistake as to the true state of affairs,
and to allow subrogation works no hardship on the junior lien holder
unless he had altered his position in reliance upon the discharge of the
prior encumbrance. His security, when he acquired it, was subject to
this superior encumbrance, and it would seem inequitable that a benefit
should be gained as a result of another man's innocent mistake.'"
In the following situation the courts have generally allowed subrogation although the party paying was not a party secondarily liable:
(1) where one, who had no knowledge of a subsequent lien, has advanced money to discharge a prior lien and received a new mortgage as
security;11 (2) where the junior lien holder, ignorant of an intervening
mortgage, has discharged the senior encumbrance;12 (3) where grantee
who took "subject to a mortgage and who later paid off the obligation
3
did not know of a subsequent encumbrance.'
It is stated in most jurisdictions that equity will refuse subrogation
' Dixon v. Morgan, 154 Tenn. 389, 285 S. W. 558 (1926).
' Capital National Bank v. Holmes, 43 Colo. 154, 95 Pac. 314 (1908) ; Dixon

v. Morgan, 154 Tenn. 389, 285 S. W. 558 (1926). But see Citizens Mercantile Co.
v. Eason, 158 Ga. 604, 123 S. E. 883 (1924) ; Lamoille County Savings Bank v.
Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 98 Atl. 1002 (1916) (holding that one is negligent by not
looking up records).
10Tibbetts v. Terrill et al., 26 Colo. A. 64, 140 Pac. 936 (1914); Smith v.
656, 4 N. E. 648 (1886) ; see Platte Valley Cattle Co. v. BosserDinsmon, 119 Ill.
man-Cate Live Stock & Loan Co., 202 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912). But see
Troyer v. Bank of De Queen, 170 Ark. 703, 218 S. W. 14 (1926) (holding that
it makes no difference that holder of second lien would be in no worse position
if subrogation were granted and that there was constructive notice of the second
lien); Rice v. Winters et al., 45 Neb. 517, 63 N. W. 830 (1895) (advancing the
idea that upon the discharge of the first lien the junior lienor has a vested right).
n Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386, 52 N. W. 35 (1892) ; Wallace v. Benner,
200 N. C. 124, 156 S. E. 795 (1931) ; 2 JoN-s, op. cit. supra note 5, §1114 (where
there is no express agreement that lender is to get a first lien he is volunteer
and not entitled to subrogation. But if there is an agreement that -heis to get first
lien and there are no intervening equities, then subrogation is applicable.). Contra:
Fort Dodge Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Scott, 86 Iowa 435, 53 N. W. 283 (1892) (failure to observe records is negligence and defeats subrogation).
119 Kan. 317, 239 Pac. 752 (1925);
"Farmers National Bank v. Glidday et al.,
Frisbee v. Frisbee, 46 Me. 444, 29 Atl. 111 (1894) (holding payment made to
protect interest) ; see Bank of U. S. v. Peter, 38 U. S. 123, 10 L. ed. 89 (1839).
3Darrough v. Kraft Co. Bank, 125 Cal. 272, 57 Pac. 983 (1899) (protection
of interest in property) ; Moring v. Privott, 146 N. C. 558, 60 S. E. 509 (1908)
(.mistake of fact). Contra: Hayden v. Huff, 60 Neb. 625, 83 N. W. 920 (1900)
(charged with laches in failure to examine records).
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where the party seeking it is a mere volunteer, 14 or is guilty of culpable
negligence. 15 The majority of courts hold that mere failure to examine
the records and discover the existence of the intervening lien does not
constitute culpable negligence. 16
North Carolina has not ruled on the problem presented by the principal case.

However, in Capehart v. Mhoon, P thought that he was

surety on an administration bond and paid under such belief. Actually
he was not liable and could have ascertained this by looking up the
records. The court held that payment was made under a mistake of
fact that allowed P to recover his payments by subrogating him to the
rights of the widow of deceased. 1" It would seem to follow that North
Carolina would grant relief where a payment has been made under a
mistake of fact as to the obligation assumed.
- In a recent decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court it was
held that the grantor was primarily liable although there had been an
express. assumption of the mortgage by the grantee.18 It might be
argued, in view of this decision, that an assuming grantee who has
discharged the debt is in effect a party secondarily liable and within the
scope of the usual rule allowing subrogation where an obligation, for
which another is primarily liable, is paid. This argument fails in the
light of former decisions which have expressly held the assuming
grantee primarily liable. 9 Thus the North Carolina rule is peculiar in
that both grantor and assuming grantee are primarily liable on the debt.
If subrogation should be granted in a situation similar to the principal
'20
case it would have to be on the basis of a "mistake of fact."
2

Ragland v. Board of Missions, 224 Ala. 325, 140 So. 435 (1932)

(called a

volunteer as party paying had no interest to protect and under no obligation to

pay); Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Barron, 173 Ga. 242, 160 S. E. 228
(1931) (no agreement that lender to receive first lien and thus a volunteer);
Flannay v. Utley, 9 Ky. L. 581, 3 S. W. 412 (1887) (a volunteer as party paying
was not secondarily liable) ; Wallace v. Benner, 200 N. C. 124, 156 S. E. 795
(1931) (states the general rule that if a mortgagor requests loan, then lender is
not volunteer). But see Pons v. Yazoo R. Co., 131 La. 313, 59 So. 721 (1912).
5 Tibbetts v. Terrill et al., 26 Colo. A. 64, 140 Pac. 936 (1914).
"Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386, 52 N. W. 35 (1892) ; Dixon v, Morgan,
154 Tenn. 389, 285 S. W. 558 (1914) ("Culpable negligence is the failure to perform some duty.... . It does not arise from one's failure to look up the records.") ;
Note (1931) 70 A. L. R. 1396. Contra: Connor v. Welch, 51 Wis. 431, 8 N. W.

260 (1881) ; Ragan v. Standard Scale Co., 128 Ga. 544, 58 S. E. 31 (1907) ; cf.

Joyce v. Dauntz, 55 Ohio St. 538, 45 N. E. 900 (1896) (where it was held that
knowledge of the junior lien does not prevent subrogation).
I Capehart v. Mhoon, 58 N. C. 178 (1859) (P wanted to be subrogated so
that he could recover his payments made to the widow from those who were
sureties in fact).
I Commercial National Bank of Charlotte v. Carson, 207 N. C. 495, 177 S. E.
335 (1934) ; Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. RLv. 337.
"Parlier v. Miller, 186 N. C. 501, 119 S. E. 898 (1923) ; Keller v. Parish, 196
N. C. 733, 147 S. E. 9 (1929).
Moring v. Privott, 146 N. C. 558, 60 S. E. 509 (1908) (The grantee 'had taken
"subject to" a mortgage which he thought was the only encumbrance on the
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In the instant case it seems clear that the heirs, the proponents of the
action, are in the relative position of a subsequent lien holder. The
result reached by the Alabama Court is inequitable and unjust. Johnson, as evidenced by his paying off the entire amount of both mortgages, was laboring under a mistake of fact as to his title. If the
Alabama Court had allowed subrogation the heirs would have been in
precisely the same situation they occupied before the mortgages were
assumed and paid. Refusal of subrogation allows the heirs to profit at
the expense of the grantee's innocent mistake.
J. WILLIAM COPELAND.
Municipal Corporations-Right to Insure in Mutual
Insurance Organizations.
Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other taxpayers of the district,
brought this action to restrain the Superintendent of Public Instruction
from accepting and paying a premium on a policy of insurance on
school property issued by a mutual fire insurance company. The policy
provided for an annual premium of $12.35, plus a contingent liability
limited to the amount of one premium, payable only when the assets of
the company did not meet its current liabilities. Plaintiff alleged that
such a contract would violate the constitutional provision1 that "no...
municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan
its credit . . . except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a
vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein." Furthermore, it
was contended that the acceptance of this policy would make the school
board a stockholder in a private organization. Held: Taking the mutual
policy did not lend the credit of the school district; that in any event
the expense was a "necessary" one; and the school district did not be2
come a stockholder in a private organization.
This case is one of first impression in North Carolina. In other
jurisdictions the power of municipal corporations to insure in mutual
companies has been challenged on a number of grounds. First, several
states, like North Carolina, have constitutional or statutory provisions
which set out in substance that neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall pledge its faith or loan its credit to any individual,
company, institution, or association, except for governmental undertakland, and he later paid this mortgage off. There was in fact a second mortgage
and the court allowed subrogation, saying that the grantee was laboring under a
mistake of fact.). It seems, if a grantee could be laboring under a mistake of fact
when he took "subject to?' a mortgage which he later paid, that an assuming
grantee could be under a mistake of fact as to the mortgage he assumed and paid.
IN. C. CoNsT. art. VII, §7.
2Fuller v. Lockhart, 209 N. C. 61, 182 S. E. 733 (1935).
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ings. Under such provisions it is argued that since by a mutual insurance contract a member would be liable for assessments, in the absence
of sufficient assets, to pay losses incurred by other members, the municipality by taking a mutual policy would thus lend its credit contrary to
the constitutional prohibition. However, the courts have found otherwise where these contingent assessments are limited in amount.4 The
reason, as laid down in Miller v.Johnson,5 is that, where the assessment is limited to some such sum as five times one premium, this contingent assessment merely represents an arrangement where there is a
maximum contingent liability by way of premium, but only one-fifth
thereof need originally be collected, and the balance need never be
collected unless some extraordinary losses occur. However, an unlimited Contingent liability might amount to a pledge of credit.0
Second, it is contended that a member of a mutual insurance company becomes a stockholder therein, and thus the municipal corporation
by purchasing a policy would become a stockholder in a private company in violation of its inherent powers. But it seems settled that the
mere payment of premiums and (limited) contingent assessments does
not make the municipal corporation a stockholder within the definition
of the technical prohibition. 7 Nor does the bare fact that under certain
I CAL. CoxsT. art. IV, §31; art. XII, §13; IDAHO CONST. art. XII, §4; MIcH.
CoNsr. art. VIII, §25; art. X, §12, 13; Mo. CONST. art. IX, §6; MONT. CONST.
art. 13, §1; N. Y. CoNsT. art. VII, §1; art. VIII, §10; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1936) tit. 16, §§4160-501; WAs H. CONST. art. VII, §5; Wyo. CoNsT. art. XVI,

§6.

' Miller v. Johnson, 48 P. (2d) 956 (Cal. 1935) ("The lending of credit, if any,
is by the insurance company to the public body.") ; French v. Mayor of Millville, 66
N. J. L. 392, 49 Atl. 465 (1901), aff'd, 67 N. J. L. 349, 51 Atl. 1109 (1902) ; Johnson
v. School Dist. No. 1, 128 Ore. 9, 270 Pac. 764 (1928), rehearing denied, 128
Ore. 9, 273 Pac. 386 (1929) (court here decided the question of public credit solely
on the fact there was no contingent liability in the policy) ; D wning v. School
Dist. of Erie, 297 Pa. 474, 147 Atl. 239 (1929) (contract really amounted to a
loan of credit to the school district) ; Burton v. School Dist. No. 19, 47 Wyo. 462,
38 P. (2d) 610 (1934); 1 CooLEY, CoNsTiunoNA, LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927)
469, note; 1 COOLEY's BR=mS o,r IxSURANCC (2nd ed. 1927) 104; 3 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CoRPoRAToNs (5th ed. 1911) §976, note; 5 MCQUILAN, MUNICIPAL
CoaPoRATioNs (2nd ed. 1928) 959; see People v. Stanley, 193 Cal. 428, 225 Pac. 1
(1924).
'48 P. (2d) 956 (Cal. 1935).
'School Dist. No. 8 v. Twin Falls County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Idaho 400,
164 Pac. 1174 (1917). Statute authorizing tho establishment of mutual insurance
companies in Idaho provided that "policies issued by the company must state
specifically that liability of each member is not limited." Under such a requirement a school board might incur an indebtedness in excess of the income or
revenue provided for it in any one year, thus violating IDAHO CoNST. art. VIII,
§3. Hence, such contracts would be void. North Carolina expressly provides
that this contingent liability cannot be less than the amount of one annual premium.
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6351.
7 Miller v. Johnson, 48 P. (2d) 956 (Cal. 1935); Carlton v. So. Mutual Ins.
Co., 72 Ga. 371 (1884) (suggests by dictum that the use of the word "stockholder" in the charter and policy of a mutual organization is not a use in such a
technical sense as to prohibit municipal corporations from participating) ; Dalzell
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conditions a mutual organization may pay dividends to its members

make the municipal corporation a corporate stockholder. 8
Third, frequently by statute, or the provisions of the charter, bylaws, or the policy itself, the company is given a lien on the insured
property for unpaid assessments.9 Therefore, it is urged, this policy
would be void. It is against public policy for a body politic to give a
lien on its property. 10 However, the courts have met this objection
-by transferring and making enforceable such a lien against funds set
aside for that particular purpose.11
It seems evident that mutual insurance organizations are becoming
more and more popular as a means of protection, largely because of the
relatively small cost of participation. It is not surprising that the courts
tend to enable municipalities to effect this economy by upholding such
contracts, in the absence of any express constitutional or statutory
provisions to the contrary.12
0. W. CLAYTON.
v. Bourbon County Board of Education, 193 Ky. 171, 235 S. W. 360 (1921)
(school board is a "person' within statute providing that any person may become
a mnember); French v. Mayor of Millville, 66 N. J. L. 392, 49 Atl. 465 (1901),
aff'd, 67 N. J. L. 349, 51 AtI. 1109 (1902); Johnson v. School Dist. No. 1, 128
Ore. 9, 270 Pac. 764 (1928); see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Street, 265 S. W.
397 (Tex., 1924) (mere act of purchasing a policy does not make the member a
stockholder).
8
Carlton v. So. Mutual Ins. Co., 72 Ga. 371 (1884) ; see Johnson v. School
Dist. No. 1, 128 Ore. 9, 270 Pac. 764 (1928) (the contract here would seem to
give dividends in the form of non-assessable policies when the assets of the company exceed $200,000).
0Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) §712; Mutual Assurance Co. v. Faxon, 19 U. S.
606, 5 L. ed. 342 (1821) (Virginia statute giving lien on insured property);
Farmers' Home Ins. Co. v. Carey, 130 Ky. 602, 113 S. W. 841 (1908) (statute
does not provide lien for membership fees but only for assessments) ; see York
County Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowden, 57 Me. 286 (1869); Huggins v. Home
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 107 Miss. 650, 65 So. 646 (1914) (statute giving lien for both
unpaid premiums and assessments held constitutional); Halfpenny v. Peoples'
Fire Ins. Co., 85 Pa. 48 (1877) ; South Carolina Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Price, 56
S. C. 407, 34 S. E. 696 (1900) (action on lien for assessment equitable in nature).
10Noonan v. Hastings, 101 Ky. 312, 41 S. W. 32 (1897) ; Ausbuck v. Schardien,
20 Ky. Law Rep. 178, 45 S. W. 507 (1898) ; Page Trust Co. v. Carolina Const.
Co., 191 N. C. 664, 132 S. E. 804 (1926) (no lien on school property for labor
and21material furnished in construction of building).
Dalzell v. Bourbon County Board of Education, 193 Ky. 171, 235 S. W. 360
(1921). Liens against municipal corporations were held to attach particular iunds
in: Los Angeles Stone Co. v. National Surety Co., 178 Cal. 247, 173 Pac. 79
(1918) (attached surety bond put up by contractor) ; Alexander Lumber Co. v.
Farmer City, 272 Ill. 264, 111 N. E. 1012 (1916) (mechanic's lien runs against
funds due a contractor in hands of the city) ; N. A. Williams Co. v. McCarthy,
284 Ill. 604, 120 N. E. 485 (1918) (materialmen's lien attaches bonds issued to
pay contractor) ; Noonan v. Hastings, 101 Ky. 312, 41 S. W. 32 (1897) ; Garrison
v. Borio, 61 N. J. E. 236, 47 AtI. 1060 (1901) (lien is given on contract price of
improvements); Butts v. Randall, 145 Misc. Rep. 708, 260 N. Y. Supp. 713 (1932).
32Some states have passed statutes authorizing municipal corporations to insure
in mutual insurance companies. For example: MIcH. Comp. LAws (1929) §7385;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 53, §1761.
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Real Property-Powers of Appointment-Proper ExecutionLapse Statutes-Estoppel.
A deeded land to B for life with a remainder over to B's children,
if any, upon her death; if no children then in fee simple or otherwise
to such persons as B by will should appoint. B, for a consideration,
conveyed the land to C and recited in the instrument the exercise of
power as given by A's deed. C sold to the present defendant; then C
died, leaving the plaintiff as his only heir at law. Subsequently, B
died without issue and devised the same property to C, reciting the
power of appointment in the will. The plaintiff now brings an action
of ejectment to recover the property from defendant and bases her
claim on the lapse statute, which provides that living issue of a predeceased devisee shall take as if he inherited directly from his deceased
ancestor. Held: reversing trial court, for plaintiff, on the ground that
she was substituted as appointee. Title passed to plaintiff from the
donor of the power; and the appointee took nothing under donee's will
and only a life estate under the deed.'
To attain the result of the instant case it was necessary for the
court to sustain the plaintiff's contention as to the applicability of the
lapse statute to testamentary appointments. This problem is presented
to the courts in two situations in connection with powers of appointment. (1) In cases where the donee predeceases the donor, the issue
of the donee has been substituted for him and allowed to take the
property, if the power was general and the donee could have claimed
a fee ;2 or the property, in order to prevent intestacy, was allowed to
pass according to the donee's will.3 The general rule, however, is
that a power lapses, or never comes into existence if the donee dies
before the person who created the power.4 (2) Where the appointee
'Newton v. Bullard, 182 S. E. 614 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1935).
2
Schieffelin v. Kessler, 5 Rawle 115 (Pa. 1835).
'Condit v. Dehart, 62 N. J.Ch. 18, 40 Atl. 726 (1898) ; In re Piffard's Estate,
111 N. Y. 410, 18 N. E. 78 (1888), aff'g, 42- Hun. 34 (N. Y. 1886) (in the latter
case the court refused to sustain the power as such, saying the property passed
by the donor's will, although it went to persons designated in donee's will) ; cf.
Wallace v. Deihl, 202 N. Y. 156, 95 N. E. 646 (1911), modifying jiudgment in
134 App. Div. 942, 118 N. Y. Supp. 149 (1909) (where issue of a contingent remainderman, who had predeceased the donor, were claiming against a donee who
had the power to appoint the residuum, it was 'held that the property had lapsed
and fallen in the residuum).
'itre McCurdy's Estate, 197 Calif. 276, 240 Pac. 498 (1925) ; Curley v. Lynch,
206 Mass. 289, 92 N. E. 429 (1910) ; FARWELL, Powas (7th ed.) §226; SUGDEX,
PowEns (8th ed.) 460. But consider the following cases where it is held that the
power necessarily ceases on the death of the grantee when no one else is authorized to execute it: Supreme Colony v. Towne, 87 Conn. 644, 89 Atl. 264 (1914) ;
Hotchkiss v. Elting, 36 Barbour 38 (N. Y. 1861); Chambers v. Tulane, 9 N. 3.
Eq. 146 (1852); Coleman v. Beach, 97 N. Y. 545 (1885); Stamper v. Venable,
117 Tenn. 557, 97 S.NV. 812 (1906) ; 49 C. J. 1250.
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predeceases the donee of a testamentary power the lapse statutes have
been applied to allow the issue of the appointee to take in order to
prevent whole or partial intestacy, as the case may be, 5 and also in
order to satisfy obligations existing at the time the appointment takes
effect.6 However, if the donee provides that the devise shall lapse
such proviso is enforcible. 7 In considering the applicability of the
lapse statutes the courts have adhered strictly to the letter of the
statute. 8 There are some writers who feel that the statutes should
have no application in cases where the donee is given a life estate with
a general power of appointment, since the donor makes the donee
wait until the latter's death to exercise the power and, therefore, intends the donee to appoint only to persons who survive him. 9 It is
submitted that the lapse statute should not have been applied in the
instant case, as it was used for the purpose of letting the plaintiff take
as substituted appointee under the donee's will ;10 but in order to circumvent an estoppel, and to defeat the defendant, who was a purchaser for value from the deceased appointee, the court resorted to
the doctrine that the plaintiff took by way of purchase from the party
creating the power and, therefore, was in by virtue of the donor's
deed rather than by the donee's will."1
A power is regarded as general when, as in the case at hand, its
exercise is not restricted by the donor to particular objects or ben'Thompson v. Pew, 214 Mass. 520, 102 N. E. 122 (1913); In re Lyndall's
Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 476 (1892); Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S. E. 209,
75 A. L. R. 1383 (1931); cf. Duke of Malborough v. Lord Godolphin, 2 Ves. 61
(1750); PAGE, WILS (2 ed. 1926) §1249; JARMAN, Wns (5th ed. 1880) §642.
'Stevens v. King, 2 Ch. 30 (1904). (The donee of the power had received
more than her aliquot share of property under a settlement in which the appointee
had made distribution. The court held that the moral obligation to repay the
excess, which was a -personal loss to the appointee, was sufficient to sustain the
power here so as to prevent lapse.)
7 Ii re Beaumont's Estate, 147 Misc. Rep. 118, 263 N. Y. Supp. 427 (1933).
See Lincoln Trust Co. v. Adams, 107 Misc. Rep. 639, 177 N. Y. Supp. 889,
891 (1919) (The court said any claims of the heirs at law could be eliminated,
since there was no statute which could save an appointment to a first cousin from
lapse when the appointee dies before the will takes effect.) ; Burrus v. Nelson's
Executor, 132 Va. 17, 110 S. E. 254 (1922) (where an administrator of a deceased
appointee attempted to get the property).
.PAGE,
WILxs (2d ed. 1926) §1171; ROOD, WILs (2d ed. 1926) §758; SIMES,
LAw oF FuTmr INTERsT (1936) §259; THoMPsoN, CONSTRUcTION OF WZLS

(1928) §363.
"Thompson v. Pew, 214 Mass. 520, 102 N. E. 122 (1913); In re Lyndall's
Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 476 (1892); Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S. E. 209,
75 A. L. R. 1383 (1931); PAGE, WILLs (2d ed. 1926)

§1249; JARMAN , WILLS

(5th ed. 1880) §642.
"For this doctrine see: Jackson v. Franklin, 179 Ga. 840, 177 S. E. 731, 97
A. L. R. 1071 (1934) ; Christy v. Pulliam, 17 Ill. 59 (1855) ; In re Harbeck's Will,
161 N. Y. 211, 55 N. E. 50 (1900) ; KAIE, FuTU

INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920) §610;

Simes, Devolidion of Title (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 480.
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eficiaries ;12 and it is none the less general because it is exercisable
only by testamentary documents.' 8 It would seem that a person having a life estate plus a general power of appointment should have a
fee, since he could sell the life estate and appoint the remainder to
the same party. The donee takes a fee, however, only where the devise
is in general terms with the power annexed. 14 If, as in the instant
case, the quantity of the first taker's estate is expressly defined or limited for life, the existence of the power will not enlarge the life estate
into a fee under the great weight of authority'r because the power is
considered neither an estate nor property in itself.10 Some few jurisdictions take a contrary viewpoint based on the theory that an absolute
power of disposition when added to a life estate enlarges the latter into
1
a fee. r
Where the majority doctrine is adhered to, the power must be
exercised in strict conformity with the instrument creating it, and,
" Whitlock and Rose v. McCaughan, 21 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1927);

Frank v. Frank, 305 Ill.
81, 137 N. E. 51 (1922) ; In re Lawrence's Estate, 136
Pa. 354, 20 AtI. 521 (1890) ; for a discussion see Comment (1932) 17 CoRN. L.

Q. 287.

'Lesser v. Burnett, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Johnstone v. Commissioner Internal Revenue, 76 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); St. Matthews
Bank v. De Charette, 259 Ky. 802, 83 S.W. (2d) 471 (1935) ; Lyon v. Alexander,
304 Pa. 288, 156 At. 84 (1931).
"Howard v. Carusi, 109 U. S. 725, 3 Sup. Ct. 575, 27 L. ed. 1089 (1884);
Evans v. Folks, 135 Mo. 397, 37 S. W. 126 (1896) ; Downey v. Bordan, 36 N. J.
Law 460 (1872), aff'g 35 N. J. Law 74 (1871); Note (1928) MicH. L. R. 703;
Simms, LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS (1936) §252. For a general classification see
THomPsoN, CoNsTRucnor oF WmLLs (1928) §598.
'Downie v. Downie, 4 Fed. 55 (C. C. D. Ind. 1880); Mathis v. Glanson, 149
Ga. 752, 102 S. E. 351 (1920); Homans v. Foster, 232 Mass. 4, 121 N. E. 417
(1919); Chewning v. Mason, 158 N. C. 578, 74 S. E. 357, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.)
805 (1912) ; Cagle v. Hampton, 196 N. C. 470, 146 S.E. 88 (1929) ; Learning v.
Huffman, 96 N. J.Eq. 249, 124 Atl. 704 (1924) ; Coles v. Dressier, 315 Ill.
142,
146 N. E. 162 (1924); Podarit v. Clark, 118 Iowa 264, 91 N. W. 1091 (1902);
Mountjoy v. Kassleman, 225 Ky. 55, 7 S. W. (2d) 512 (1928). Notes (1925)
36 A. L. R. 1177; (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1153.
"Carver v. Jackson, 29 U. S.1, 7 L. ed. 61 (1830) ; Patterson v. Lawrence,
83 Ga. 703, 10 S. E. 355, 7 L. R. A. 143 (1889) ; Steiff v. Seibert, 128 Iowa 746,
105 N. W. 328 (1905) ; Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267 (1872) ; Chewning v.
Mason,
158 N. C. 578, 74 S.E. 357, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 805 (1912).
1
Gibson v. Gibson, 213 Mich. 31, 181 N. W. 41 (1921), criticized and impliedly overruled in Quarton v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N. W. 465 (1930) ;
Ement v. Blair, 121 Tenn. 240, 118 S. W. 685 (1908); Bristow v. Bristow, 138
Va. 67, 120 S. E. 859 (1924); Wiant v. Lynch, 104 W. Va. 507, 140 S. E. 487
(1927). TaEOBALD, WmLs (8th ed. 1927) c. XXXIX, §III shows the English
authorities to be in accord with this minority view. For a general discussion see
Comment (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rxv. 521. But cf. Ironsides v. Ironsides, 150 Iowa
628, 130 N. W. 414 (1911) (vhere the testator gave his wife an estate for life,
and the "remainder of the estate" [interpreted to mean the remainder after the
life estate] was to be at her disposal, the court held she took a fee since she was

given the use of the property for life plus the only additional power, that of dis-

posal, that could exist in any one prior to death. The majority rule was recognized by the court, but the peculiar language in the instrument was determinative
of the result reached).
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therefore, if the power is testamentary, an attempted execution thereof
by deed is ordinarily held invalid.1 8 However, equity has not refused
relief where the power, which by its terms called for the use of a deed,
was exercised by will,' 9 but it has refused to act in the converse situation, reasoning that the donor intended the power to be revocable until
the donee's death. 20 The strictness of these decisions in the latter type
of case may be attributed in part to the fact that the litigation involved
the rights of volunteers, and hence the law emanating from the cases
perhaps presupposed the protection of the rights of an appointee for
value or a purchaser for value from such an appointee.21 Some jurisdictions in order to protect creditors, incumbrancers and purchasers, as
well as to settle title and make the property freely alienable, have enacted legislation to give the donee, who has a life estate with absolute
power of disposition, a fee absolute as regards the above classes. 22 The
'Hannan v. Slush, 5 F. (2d) 718 (E. D. Mich. 1925) ; Pope v. Safe Deposit

and Trust Co., 163 Md. 239, 161 Atl. 404 (1932); BumDIci, REA. PROPERTY
(1914) 737; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1078. For a collection of
authorities on this point see THompsoN, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS (1928) §601. But
consider these cases where the instrument creating the power designated the time
for disposal as "at the death" or "decease" of the donee, and it was held that the
disposition was not restricted to a testamentary one, because no specific mode of
exercising the power was designated: Christy v. Pulliam, 17 Ill. 59 (1855) ; Sinke
v. Muncie, 110 Kan. 345, 203 Pac. 1102 (1922) ; Sherill v. Querbacker, 182 Ky.
626, 206 S. W. 876 (1918); Kimball v. Sullivan, 113 Mass. 345 (1873); Tillet v.
Nixon, 180 N. C. 195, 140 S. E. 352 (1920). Contra: Weir v. Smith, 62 Texas 1
(1884), cf. In re Gardner, 140 N. Y. 122, 35 N. E. 439 (1893).
Sneed v. Sneed Ambl., 64 (Ch. 1747) ; Wade v. Paget, 1 Bro. Ch. 363 (Ch.
1784) ; Darlington v. Pultney Comp., 260 (Ch. 1775) ; Bruce v. Bruce L. R., 11
Eq. 371 (1871); Toilet v. Toilet, 2 P. Wms. 489 (Eq. 1728). TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1912) §287; SUGDEN, PowERs (8th ed.) §558. But cf. Jochers
v. Hochmeyer, 203 Ala. 621, 84 So. 709 (1920).
'Wilkes v. Burnes, 60 Md. 64 (1882); Bentham v. Smith, Cheves Eq., 33
(S. C. 1819); TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1912) 636; FARWEL=, PoWERS
(7th ed.) 332; THomPsON. CONSTRUCTION OF WIS (1928) 773.
'FARWFLL, PowERs (7th ed.) 264; semble KALE, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed
1920) p. 471. However, where the proper instrument is used and the defect is
one of form, equity will aid the appointee if it is a charity (Sayre v. Sayre, 7
Hare 377) (V. C. 1849) ; or is a person entitled to be provided for by the donee,
such as a wife or legitimate child [Ward v. Stanard, 82 App. Div. 386, 81 N. Y.
Supp. 906 (1903); Fothergill v. Fothergill, 1 Eq. Cas. 222 (1702)]; or if the
person has paid value [Beatly v. Clark, 20 Calif. 11 (1862) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of N. Y. v. Everett, 40 N. J. Eq. 345, 3 Atl. 26 (1885) 1; but not if the appointee
is a mere volunteer [Sargeson v. Sealey, 2 Atl. 411 (Ch. 1742)]. But see Lynn
v. Lynn, 33 Ill. App. (1889) (the court refused to aid execution in favor of a
grandchild) ; and Wooster v. Cooper, 59 N. J. Eq., 45 Atl. 381 (1899) ( equitable
relief was refused a nephew).
SALA.
CODE (1928) §6927-6931; MIcH. COmr'. LAWS (1929) §13003-13005;
MINN. GEN. STS. (Mason, 1927) §8115-8119; CONSOL. LAws OF N. Y. (Cahill,
1931) c. 52, §151; OY.A. REv. LAws (1921) §8522-8526; S. D. REv. CODE (1929)
§426-430; WIs. STAT. (1931) §232.10-232.12. For a discussion of- this type of
statute see 3 THompsoN, REAL, PROPERTY (1924) §2208. For cases interpreting and
applying the N. Y. Statute (which is the model one) in the situation where the
donee of a general testamentary power deeds the property, see: Hume v. Randall,
141 N. Y. 499, 36 N. E. 402 (1894) ; Deegan v. Wade, 144 N. Y. 573, 39 N. E. 692

(1914).
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law, however, has not completely forgotten the purchaser for value
even where there are no statutes to protect him, as it has refused to
allow the donee of the power to exercise it to the prejudice of the
rights of others whose rights have been created by virtue of prior
transactions with the donee.23 This view seems sound in light of the
fact that even in the case of a release, where ordinarily no consideration
is passed, the donee's deed operates as an estoppel to the subsequent
exercise of a general testamentary power.2 4 And in the principal case
the additional factor of consideration is present to establish the defendant's equity. Professor Gray has pointed out the inconsistency of allowing a donee of a general testamentary power to release it inter-vi os
and not allowing him to appoint it by deed.2 5 The decisions have not
totally disregarded this point of legal logic, and, as a result, purchasers
from a donee of a general testamentary power may derive good title by
deed ;26 and this is so even where the donee has only an equitable life
estate.2 7 It is submitted, in the instant case, that since the donee had a
'Johnston v. Yates, 39 Ky. 491 (1893); Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135,
98 N. E. 1064 (1912) (where the donee of a general testamentary power mortgaged the property, 'he was not allowed to subsequently exercise the power so as
to prejudice the rights of the mortgagee, and the court said that this rule would
prevail in spite of the fact that this appointee would take from the donor) ; Brown
v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67, 69 (1881) ; Legget v. Doremus, 25 N. J. Eq. 122, 127(1874) ; In re Hancock, 2 Ch. 173 (1896) ; Foakes v. Jackson, 1 Ch. 807 (1900).
Cf. Grosevenor v. Bowen, 15 R. 1.49, 10 At. 589 (1887) (where specific performance was granted to a donee of a general testamentary power who had
contracted to convey a fee simple).
'Thorington v. Thorington, 82 Ala. 489, 1 So. 716 (1887) ; Hill v. Hill, 81
Ga. 516, 8 S. E. 879 (1889) ; Baker v. Wilmert, 288 Ill. 434, 123 N. E. 627 (1919) ;
Johnston v. Harriss, 202 Ky. 193, 259 S. W. 35 (1924) ; Tillet v. Nixon, 180 N. C.
195, 104 S. E. 352 (1920) Grosevenor v. Bowen, 15 R. I. 549, 10 Atl. 589 (1887) ;
Atkinson v. Dowling, 33 S. C. 414, 12 S. E. 93 (1890) ; Hume v. Hoard, 5 Grat.
374 (Va. 1849) ; Foakes v. Jackson, 1 Ch. 807 (1900) ; 49 C. J. 1288. Also see 44
and 45 Victoria C. 41 §52 (1881).
' Gray, Release and Discharge of Powers (1911) 24 HARv. L. Rv. 511, 531.
Professor Simes points out that to allow a release makes the property freely
alienable, and, since the donee is usually under no duty to the -donor, he should be
permitted to extinguish the power in order to make the property alienable. The
donee would not defeat the desires of donor any more by extinguishing the power
than he would by releasing it. SImEs, LAw OF FUTURE INTEMEsTs (1936) §289.
'Beatley v. Clark, 20 Cal. 11 (1862) ; Baker v. Wilmert, 288 Ill. 434, 123 N. E.
627 (1919) (where it was held that a general testamentary power, if not coupled
with a trust, could be extinguished); Johnston v. Yates, 39 Ky. 491 (1839);
Mountjoy v. Kassleman, 225 Ky. 55, 7 S. W. (2d) 572 (1928) ; Underwood v. Cane,
176 Mo. 1, 75 S. W. 451 (1903); Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 156 Atl. 84
(1931) (in which the court held that the extinguishment of a general testamentary
power could take any form); Grosevenor v. Bowen, 15 R. 1. 549, 10 Atl. 589
(1887) ; Hume v. Hoard, 5 Grat. 374 (Va. 1849) ; Freeman's Administrator v. Butters, 94 Va. 406, 26 S. E. 845 (1897) (in which the court said that the defense of
being a bona fide purchaser would be a valid one) ; Foakes v. Jackson, 1 Gh. 807

(1900).
2

1McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139 (1908) (where the defendant
was a purchaser from an appointee-purchaser). But see the following cases where
the donee contracted to will the property to a party who parted with value on the
faith of such a promise, and, on his failure to will the property, the court refused
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general power and the appointee was a purchaser for value, the latter
could have been given an indefeasible fee which would have protected
the defendant as purchaser from the appointee.
In the event the appointee had lived, he would have taken the property by the donee's will, in which case his title would have enured to
28
Grantthe defendant by virtue of the doctrine of feeding the estoppel.
ing that there is sufficient privity for the plaintiff, as heir of the appointee, to take under the donee's will by virtue of the lapse statutes,2 9
although for other purposes he takes from the donor,3 0 the same privity
should have been sufficient to bind him as to the deceased appointee's
transactions with a purchaser for value. Therefore, the plaintiff should
have been estopped to claim through the appointee, by virtue of the
donee's will, as against the defendant's title which was derived for value
B. Il vIN Bo=.
through the appointee's deed.
Torts-Liability of Public Officers--Malice.
In an action against the defendants as county commissioners to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff
when assaulted by other prisoners in the county jail, demurrer to the
complaint was sustained on appeal.' It seems that it was customary
for the prisoners to hold a "Kangaroo Court" to try new prisoners on
fictitious charges, impose a so-called fine, and if such fine was not paid
the prisoner before the kangaroo court was assaulted. It was alleged
that defendants knew of the custom and failed to provide for the safety
of the prisoners by ordering and establishing proper rules and regulations as required by C. S. §1317. Held, this was a discretionary duty
and in the absence of an allegation that the defendants acted corruptly
or with malice, a demurrer to the complaint should be sustained.
The case of Betts v. Jones2 might well be considered with the prinspecific performance of the contract and granted damages in lieu thereof: O'Donnell v. Barbey, 129 Mass. 453 1880); Winton v. Pratt, 228 Mass. 468, 117 N. E.
919 (1917) ; cf. Security Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Ward, 10 Del. Ch. 408, 93
Atl. 435 (1915); Beyfus v. Lawley, L. R. App. Cas. 411 (1903) SImES, LAw oF
FuTURE INTERESTS (1936) §265.

2 Oliver v. Holt, 141 Ga. 126, 80 S. E. 630 (1913).
'Thompson

v. Pew, 214 Mass. 520, 102 N. E. 122 (1913) ; li re Lyndal's
PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) §1249; JARMAN,

Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 476 (1892);
WmLus (5th ed. 1880) 642.

Jackson v. Franklin, 179 Ga. 840, 177 S. E. 731 (1934) ; Christy v. Pulliam,
17 Ill. 59 (1855); In re Harbeck's Will, 161 N. Y. 211, 55 N. E. 50 (1900);
KALE, FuTuIR INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920) §610; Simes, Devolution of T;11, (1928)
22 ILL. L. REv. 480.
2 Moye v. McLawhorn, Smith, Cox, Williams, and Dudley, 208 N. C. 812,

182 2S.E. 493 (1935).
Betts v. Jones et al., 203 N. C. 590, 166 S. E. 589 (1932).
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cipal case. In that case action was brought against individual members
of a school committee to recover for the death of plaintiff's intestate
caused by the negligence of the driver of a school bus selected by the
defendants over the protests of the patrons of the school that he had
the reputation of being a "rough, reckless, driver, dissipated, wild and
rattling boy, rough and drinking." The complaint alleged that such
selection was wilful, wrongful, malicious, and corrupt. Held, on demurrer, that the complaint stated a sufficient cause of action. At the
later trial of this action defendant's motion to dismiss, or for judgment
of nonsuit was allowed, which holding was reversed on appeal, the
court, by Stacy, C. J., saying "Malice in law is presumed from tortious
acts, deliberately done without just cause, excuse, or justification,
which are reasonably calculated to injure another or others."3 The
evidence was sufficient to warrant an inference of malice and the submission of the issue to the jury.
The question of the liability of a public officer for the wrongful act
of a corporate body of which he is a member, or for his own wrongful
act, has not often been presented to the courts for adjudication, 4 but
the rule seems to be that where a public officer must exercise judgment
and discretion in the performance of his official and governmental
duties, he is not individually liable for a breach of such duty unless he
acts corruptly or with malice. 5 Various reasons have been advanced in
support of this rule, some of which are: (1) public policy of encouraging responsible men to fill public office,0 and (2) since the state commands one to exercise discretion, it would not be fair to penalize him
7
should his judgment err.
Judicial officers are immune from civil liability while purporting to
perform their functions as such within their jurisdiction.8 "It is of the
'Betts v. Jones et al., 208 N. C. 410, 181 S. E. 334 (1935).
'22 R. C. L.
'Commercial
1920) ; Hipp v.
juries resulting

487.
Trust Co. of Hagerstown v. Burch et al., 267 Fed. 907 (S. D. Ga.
Ferrall et al., 173 N. C. 167, 91 S. E. 831 (1917) (action for infrom highway commission's failure to repair a brdge. Held,

public officials exercising discretion are not liable unless they act corruptly and
with malice) ; Spruill v. Davenport, 178 N. C. 364, 100 S. E. 527 (1919) ; Carpenter v. Atlanta and C. A. L. Ry. Co., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E, 693 (1922)
(public officer not liable for neglect to exercise discretionary powers unless he
acts corruptly or with malice) ; Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S. W. 949
(1918) ; HARPER, LA W OF TORTS (1st ed. 1933) 668.
6 Commercial Trust Co. of Hagerstown v. Burch et al., 267 Fed. 907 (S. D.
Ga. 1920), cited note 5, supra (not only would it be difficult to get responsible
men to fill public office, but there would be constant tempetation to yield officially
to unlawful demands, less private liability be asserted and enforced).
7 Note (1931) 17 VA. L. R. 817, 818.
8
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335, 20 L. ed. 646 (1871) ; Alzea v. Johnson, 231
U. S. 106, 34 Sup. Ct. 27, 58 L. ed. 142 (1913) ; Cunningham v. Dillard, 20 N. C.
485 (1839) (no action against a justice of the peace for taking insufficient security
because no action can be supported against a judge or justice of the peace, acting
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highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial
officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon
his own convictions without apprehension of personal consequence to
himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without
which no judiciary can be respectable or useful." Some jurisdictions,
influenced by the above rule, have designated certain public officers as
quasi-judicial and have given them a conditional immunity, 10 thus reaching the same result as in the cases where the officer's duty is discretionary.
However, by the great weight of authority a public officer is not
individually liable in cases where the duty is ministerial in character
and of a public nature unless the statute creating the office expressly
provides for such liability,." but if the duty is also for the benefit of an
individual the officer may be held personally liable even though there is
no such provision in the statute. 12 This liability extends to a non13
feasance as well as a misfeasance.'
In the principal case the demurrer to the complaint was sustained
because of the absence of an allegation of malice or corruption,' 4 which
judicially and within the sphere of his jurisdiction, even though there is malice
present) ; Hm~iu, op. cit. supra note 5, at 667, n. 91.
'Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335, 347, 20 L. ed. 646, 649 (1871), cited note 6,
supra.
" Templeton v. Board et al., 159 N. C. 63, 74 S. E. 735 (1912) (in action
against county commissioners ,for failure to repair a bridge held, officer termed
quasi-judicial, and interests of public policy which operate to render the judicial
officer exempt from civil liability for his judicial acts apply also to these quasijudicial officials); HARPEi, op. cit. supra note 5, at 688 (all other officials act
within the protection of a conditional privilege only, and if they act outside their
strict authority or solely from malice or for a purpose inconsistent and foreign
to the purposes and policy of the legal privilege of their office, they render themselves liable to a civil action for damages to persons harmed by such improper
conduct. This rule applies to a great number of lower executives and to administrative officers exercising what are frequently called quasi-judicial powers).
"'Hipp v. Ferrall et al., 173 N. C. 167, 91 S. E. 831 (1917), cited note 5, supra
(no individual liability where duties are of public nature and imposed entirely for
the public benefit unless the statute provides a penalty); Carpenter v. Atlanta
and C. A. L. Ry. Co. et al., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E. 693 (1922), cited note 5,
supra (no individual liability in case of breach of ministerial duty unless statute
fixes penalty).
'Hipp v. Ferrall et al., 173 N. C. 167, 91 S. E. 831 (1917), cited note 5,
supra (where duties imposed for benefit of individual, officer may be liable for

breach).

23Commercial Trust Co. of Hagerstown v. Burch et al., 267 Fed. 907 (S. D.
Ga. 1920), cited note 5, supra (officer liable for nonfeasance as well as misfeasance
in case of neglect of ministerial duty).
14
Moye v. McLawhorn, Smith, Cox, Williams and Dudley, 208 N. C. 812, 182
S. E. 493 (1935), cited note 1, supra.
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is required 15 and which was present in the Betts case. 16 There is a
possible distinction between the two cases in that in the principal case
there was a nonfeasance 17 while in the Betts case there was a misfeasance;18 in the former there was a failure to perform an alleged
duty while in the latter the defendants actually hired the incompetent
driver. However, it is immaterial whether the breach of duty is a nonfeasance or a misfeasance. 19 Since it has been determined that malice
must be alleged in the complaint 20 and proven on the trial 2' it is necessary for the court to formulate a charge to the jury to serve as a guide
for their determination of the issue. It is submitted that the following
definition, modified to suit each case, is adequate: "The malice required,
need not be express ill will toward deceased, or a conscious disregard
of his welfare, but a promiscuous disregard of the interest and welfare
of the inmates of the workhouse would be sufficient-that disregard of
public duty which results from general recklessness, as well as express
ill will."' 22 The defendants had entered upon the discharge of their
duties as county commissioners, and it would seem by the terms of the
statute23 that they owed an active duty both to the public and to the
individual prisoner. They had knowledge of the fact that the prisoners
had held "Kangaroo Courts" in the past, and they could reasonably expect that such a court would be held to "try" the plaintiff. It would seem
that defendants totally disregarded the interest and welfare of prisoners
in the county jail, including plaintiff, and it is submitted that there is
sufficient evidence in the principal case, as well as in the Betts case, to
justify an inference of malice. Since the principal case was not determined upon its merits, but rather upon the sufficiency of the complaint,
the plaintiff should be permitted to begin a new action 24 as the time for
'Templeton v. Beard et al., 159 N. C. 63, 74 S. E. 735 (1912), cited note 10,
supra (complaint which failed to allege malice upon part of county commissioners
held not sufficient).
"Betts v. Jones et al., 203 N. C. 590, 166 S. E. 589 (1932), cited note 2 supra
"'Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn., 182, 203 S. W. 949 (1918), cited note g, supra
(nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a person ought to do).
IHale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S. W. 949 (1918), cited note 5, supra
(misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do).
"Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S. W. 949 (1918) cited note 5, supra
(guard beat convict to death, commissioners having knowledge of the fact that
guard was in the habit of beating -prisoners. Held, immaterial whether breach of
duty was nonfeasance or misfeasance).

"'Templeton v. Beard et al., 159 N. C. 63, 74 S. E. 775 (1912), cited note 15,
supra.
2Hipps v. Ferrall, 173 N. C.167, 91 S.E. 831 (1917), cited note 5, supra.

2Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S. W. 949 (1918), cited note 5,suipra.

"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1317 (the board of commissioners of the

several counties shall from time to time order and establish such rules and regulations for the government and management of the prisons as may be conducive to
the interests of the public and the security and comfort of the persons confined).
2McIxTosH, N. C. PACrTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIvI. CASES (1st ed. 1929)
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amending his complaint has elapsed. 25 If the new complaint makes a
proper allegation of malice the plaintiff should be able to get his case to
the jury.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.

HOPE REVIVED FOR HOLDERS OF
SEALED NOTES
Further light, and perhaps some shadows as well, are cast upon the
problem of sealed negotiable instruments by the dictum in the recent
case of Jefferson StandardLife Ins. Co. v. Morehead.' Said Mr. Chief
Justice Stacy in listing exceptions to the parol evidence rule: "The rule
...

is not violated,.

.

. Fifth, by showing that an instrument apparently

under seal is a simple contract; provided there is no recital of a seal in
the instrument, such as 'witness my -hand and seal,' and it is not required by law to be under seal."
This is reassuring, for it lays at rest, so far as the clearest sort of a
dictum can lay anything at rest, tghe question heretofore mooted 2 of
whether a printed recital would conclusively establish the adoption of a
printed seal adjacent to the signing line. An instrument with such a
recital is now seen to be a sealed instrument beyond the reach of contradictory parol evidence.
But the reassurances go further and extend some ray of hope to
him who holds an instrument devoid of recital, i.e., one exactly like that
on which the holder was beaten in Williams v. Turner.3 The dictum
concludes, "Of course, in any event, the maker would have the burden
of overcoming the presumption arising from the presence of a seal."
The trial courts are warranted in understanding that the burden here
spoken of is the burden of proof and that the maker, to rebut it, must
offer evidence of a disclosed intent not to execute a sealed instrument or
adopt the seal. No mere internal, undisclosed intention on the matter
469 (if the plaintiff's action is dismissed upon demurrer for some formal defect,
he may bring another action correcting such defect).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §515; McKeel v. Latham, 202 N. C. 318,
162 S. E. 747 (1932). McINTosH, N. C. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
(1st ed. 1929) 466, mipra note 24 (if the demurrer is sustained, the plaintiff may,
within ten days after the return of the judgment, or within ten days after the
certificate of the supreme court on appeal, ask for leave to amend his complaint,
giving three days' notice of such motion; and if he fails to make such motion, or
leave is not granted, judgment will be entered dismissing the action).
1209 N. C. 174, 176, 183 S. E. 606, 607 (1936).
2
Note (1935) 14 N. C. L. REv. 80, 82 at footnote 4.
8208 N. C. 202, 179 S. E. 806 (1935).
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should be permitted to go in. And since a disclosed intent not to seal
will be as seldom present as the opposite-a disclosed intention to sealthe trial judge can consistently with Williams v. Turner, as now illuminated, direct for the holder on this issue in many cases.
In the earlier comment William, v. Turner was pictured as saying
substantially that a negotiable instrument with a printed symbol
"(SEAL)" is not a sealed instrument in the absence of additional
evidence of intention to adopt the seal. 4 That statement went too far.
It should be that such an instrument is a sealed instrument in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent-a more satisfactory state of the
law, though not nearly as satisfactory as a flat rule permitting no such
evidence at all. 5 In the light of this additional opinion Willia4ns v.
Turner is seen to stand for very little. It represents principally an interpretation 6 of the trial judge's finding of fact.
Nevertheless there is still room for legislation and that fact lends
interest to an early statute which first gave recognition to the presentday inutility of private seals and then validated all unsealed instruments
which had formerly required seals.7

That statute was soon repealed 8

but might serve as a starting point in considering new legislation.
'Note (1935) 14 N. C. L. REv. 80, at footnote 3.

'The rule of RESTATEmENT, Co rAcTs, (1932) §98. See Note (1935) 14 N. C.
L. REv. 80, at footnote 3.
'Misinterpretation, it is believed.
SP. L. N. C. 1879, c. 142:
AND WHEREAS, the reason for using private seals has long since
ceased, and the present forms of deeds is complex and lengthy, thereby unduly increasing the cost of registration; therefore,
The General Assembly of North Carolina do Enact:
Section 1. That all instruments hitherto requiring a private seal shall be as
good and available in law for all purposes as if sealed; and all instruments
not requiring an official seal shall be as valid to all intents and purposes in
law as if the same had been sealed.
8
P. L. N. C. 1881, c. 196.

